Harry Reid’s wobbly electoral standing

As things stand today, Sen. Reid is in considerable trouble.  Never particularly popular in his home state of Nevada, and certainly never beloved by voters, Reid has maintained poll numbers during 2009 which, to be charitable, are in the toilet.  In the last several months, numerous polls have found Reid with pitiful favorable splits for any United States Senator, let alone one who was first elected to statewide office over 30 years ago.  At the beginning of September, R2K pegged them at 36/52, two weeks later Rasmussen had them at 45/54 — and with a whooping 42 percent expressing a very unfavorable opinion of the state’s senior senator.  Perhaps even more troubling is that Reid currently finds himself down double digits to various third-tier candidates who are not well known in the state, and with personal numbers in the low 40s.  Needless to say, while Reid is not before the voters for another twleve and a half months, he finds himself deep in the hole and facing long odds in what is shaping out to be at least a mediocre year for Democrats nationally.

There are various reasons why Reid finds himself in this position right now.  For starters, as noted above, the senator has not ever been venerated by his voters.  This is not terribly surprising for anyone who has ever watched Reid: diplomatically, he has the personality of a dry Brillo pad.  But his election results bear this out.  He was first elected to the House with 58 percent, and re-elected two years later with 56 percent.  He only got 50 percent in his first Senate contest in 1986, 51 percent six years later, and just 48 percent in 1998 — when he won by just 428 votes.  Paradoxically, he won his biggest-ever victory in 2004 (61 percent), despite running in what turned out to be a terrible year for Senate Democrats.  Nevertheless, he has never been very popular, and has often had problems winning comfortably.

What seemed like Reid’s security blanket this year was that first, Nevada seemed to become a blue state in 2008 as Obama carried it by an astonishing 12 points, and second, Republicans appeared completely unable to recruit the top-notch opponent who would seemingly be needed to topple a Senate Majority Leader in his home state.  However, these two pieces of conventional wisdom have been turned on their heads, and as a result, Reid appears no better than an even-money bet to win a fifth term in the world’s most exclusive club.  Obama’s popularity has taken a big hit since his election as people remain nervous about the state of the economy.  In Nevada, where unemployment is particularly high, if Obama were on the ballot in the Silver State right now, there is no chance he would win the state as decisively as he did in November (for its part, the early-September R2K poll found Obama’s favorable split in the state at 48/41).  In short, Obama is not nearly as popular in the state as he was just a few months ago, and consequently one can no longer assume that Nevada is now a reliable blue state.

Naturally, one of Reid’s biggest problems is that he happens to preside over the Senate during a recession, and as its titular leader both institutionally and in the nation’s eyes, he bears a great share of responsibility for what the government does or does not accomplish, and more importantly what happens to the nation economically.  This is similar to the situation that faced Reid’s predecessor, former Sen. Tom Daschle when he ran for re-election in 2004.  While Democrats were in the minority at the time, President Bush and national Republicans were able to paint Daschle as the leader of national Democrats, a label which was not particularly helpful in the red state of South Dakota during a presidential year.  Daschle went on to lost in part because of this strategy.  For his part, Reid may not be in as Republican a state as South Dakota, but there is little question that Nevada is not as liberal as most of the states which boast Democratic senators.  In other words, Reid can and has been painted as the leader of a party which does not gibe perfectly with his state’s predilections.

Additional problems exist with regards to Reid’s current opposition, even though Republicans still appear unable to field a first tier or even a second tier challenger.  Second district U.S. Rep. Dean Heller opted out early.  Lt. Gov. Brian Krolicki was indicted.  Even former Rep. Jon Porter decided against a run despite prodding from the national GOP.  As things stands today, a field of mediocre nominees including Danny Tarkanian (the son of the famous former UNLV college basketball coach) and state GOP leader Sue Lowden make up the Republican pack.  And yet, while they are not ‘A’ or even arguably B-list talent, they are pounding Reid in all of the recent polling.  As the saying goes, you can’t beat something with nothing, but right now you might be able to beat the Senate Majority Leader with next to nothing.

Is a comeback possible?  Of course.  Political comebacks are nothing new, and given that Reid will be able to raise and spend tens of millions of dollars — not to mention the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) virtually at his disposal to run ads for him next year — he will be do whatever he can to hold onto power.  Additionally, if the economy improves drastically, much of the heat will be off Reid’s keyster as one of the national heads of his governing party.

Heck, for evidence a comeback, look at the current race for governor in New Jersey where incumbent Gov. Jon Corzine appears in place for a close victory after being pronounced DOA for re-election (by many including this author, who wrote Corzine’s political obituary months ago).  Comebacks can happen.  But Reid’s case should still be looked at differently than most others.  Unlike Corzine, Reid, at least right now, does not have a third-party candidate siphoning votes away from his Republican opponent.  In point of fact, he does not even have an opponent yet, but he is still lagging badly in all polling indicators.  Furthermore, Reid is, whether fair or unfair, perhaps the most visible leader of the current government after the President himself.  As a result, his popularity and broader political fate are inexplicably tied with the nation’s direction.  With things as they are, Reid’s numbers will continue to suffer and his chances for re-election will not improve.  Harry Reid appears in big trouble a little more than a year out of midterm elections.

For the sake of this academic exercise, let us assume that Reid goes on to lose next November.  Such a loss will of course be the major story of election night, as it would signify another Senate leader losing his own re-election just six years after Tom Daschle lost.  It would be a big blow for national Democrats, regardless of how well they do in other battleground contests, and Republicans will crow loudly and abundantly if they can claim Reid’s scalp.  But ultimately, these cosmetic reactions won’t be nearly as relevant or interesting as the internal fight that could develop literally moments after Reid concedes on election night.  For if Reid goes down, we will likely see a rare leadership brawl between two legislative titans: Senate Majority Whip (the number two position behind the Leader) Dick Durbin of the Land of Lincoln, and former DSCC head and current vice chairman of the Democratic caucus (the nominal number three position in the leadership hierarchy) Chuck Schumer of the Empire State.  A Durbin-Schumer fight would be fascinating for many reasons, all of which are worth analyzing here, but mainly because it would be between two leaders who each possess incredible talents and immense power.  It would be a nearly-even-matched main event.

Reid loses; what happens next?

The U.S. Senate is a deliberative, stodgy place where things happily move at a glacial pace and where seniority is king.  As is the case in the House, power rests in the hands of those who have built up the most seniority, and thus control the gavels as committee chairmen.  The seniority system, ensconced in internal procedure for eons, is simple: those who have sat in office the longest and waited their turn the longest, enjoy the richest spoils.  Not surprisingly, the same applies for how leaders are elected.  In the House, when the speakership opens up the Majority Leader is next in line, and almost always ascends to the top; ditto the Whip to the Leader position.  The same applies in the Senate, where a vacancy in a party’s Leader slot is almost always filled by the Whip, who is the Leader’s assistant and number two in all matters.  This explains how Reid himself is today Majority Leader: despite possessing little charisma and enjoying shaky electoral standing throughout his long career, he became Democratic boss because he was the whip when Daschle was beaten.  Simply put, he was next in line, and because the Senate respects process and procedure more than just about anything else, he was able to slide into the position unopposed.

Of course, until Sen. Reid actually loses, another shred of unwritten Senate protocol states that no one man, not even leaders like Durbin or Schumer can utter a single syllable about potential runs for Majority Leader.  Up to and until Harry Reid stands on the stage of some casino in Vegas and speaks the phrase “….I have just called my opponent and congratulated him…” no one can make any movement at all towards running for the job.  To do so would violate the sacred code of the Senate of never trying to take the job of a sitting member, whether it be for leadership or chairman.  Sen. Patrick Leahy learned this lesson well when word leaked out that he was lobbying to replace the aged Sen. Robert Byrd as chairman of Appropriations despite the fact that Byrd still held the gavel (albeit feebly).  In response, Byrd and his staff did not need to enunciate a word of shocked objection; Leahy immediately backtracked when word got out.  Leahy knew that any active campaigning for the job of a colleague would have been crippling to his ambitions.  Perhaps not coincidentally, when Byrd ultimately stepped down, the chairmanship went to Sen. Daniel Inouye, who had both seniority over Leahy, and knew to keep his ambitions quieter.

Yet, because of the established order, it would seem that Durbin would be a shoo-in to replace Reid because he has been the whip since Reid ascended to the leader position.  However, this is not so because of two factors: (1) the unique dynamics in play in the current Democratic caucus; and (2) the unprecedented strength of Chuck Schumer.

Schumer’s rising stock

Chuck Schumer is today a seminal figure in the Democrats’ legislative leadership, in that he is incredibly well-respected by his colleagues both for his intelligence in policy-making and his sharp political acumen.  Not to mention that he is also respected — and feared — by Members of the Republican Party for the latter attribute.

First elected to the House in 1980, Schumer came to the Senate in 1998 by beating a three-term incumbent in a race that cost over $40 million dollars (and where he was outspent 3-to-2).  Schumer is a bright and active member on the Banking, Finance, and Judiciary Committees, and he is outspoken and authoritative on a plethora of disparate issues.  Legislatively, he is a national leader and a master of local, constituent-level services — a fairly rare combination in a body with lazy, contented incumbents.  Even more impressive, Schumer may be his party’s wisest strategist today, perhaps even more so than Rahm Emanuel.  It is in the arena of pure politics where Schumer made a name for himself on the national stage, as he was easily the most successful head of the DSCC in the last generation.

As head of the DSCC during the 2005-2006 cycle, Schumer spearheaded Democratic efforts to retake the Senate as they faced a 55-45 split in the minority.  While Democrats appeared ready to ride an anti-President Bush, anti-Republican tide, there were few Senate retirements in the cycle.  As a result, while it looked likely that Democrats would do well, the party’s chances of retaking the upper chamber appeared remote for much for much of the two years.  Schumer proved an expert at his job, as he was able to heavily outraise his Republican counterpart and recruit a slate of excellent challengers.  In the end, his efforts bore fruit, as Democratic challengers which Schumer had pushed and shepherded throughout the process knocked off incumbents in Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Virginia; Democrats also held open seats in Maryland, Minnesota, and New Jersey, while falling just short in tough Tennessee.  These victories gave Democrats control of the Senate for the first time since Republicans took the Senate in 2002 (after losing it for a year and a half after the famous Jeffords party-switch).

Schumer was so good at his job that Leader Reid asked him to run the DSCC for a second consecutive cycle, a difficult request given the rigorous demands of heading up the campaign committee.  Nonetheless, Schumer took the job with gusto and worked hard for a goal that seemed even more unattainable than a majority in 2006: getting Democrats to 60 seats.  Ultimately, Schumer remained successful in both fundraising and recruiting, and Democrats captured eight new Senate seats: Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia.

In the aftermath of the 2008 elections, Reid faced a quandary: how to take care of Schumer.  With the whip position filled by Durbin, Reid created the position Vice Chair of the Democratic Caucus as a means of rewarding Schumer, and began to rely on Schumer as one of his most trusted-colleagues.  With the Democrats in complete control of the government, Schumer was now a big fish in a big pond.

Let’s be clear on what this all means at the present time.  This is not to say that Schumer was solely responsible for Democrats’ winning a collective 14 Senate seats in two cycles.  A big part of these victories came from the quality of the candidates themselves, the national mood in the two cycles, and Barack Obama’s strength at the top of the ticket in 2008.  Still, Schumer played as large a role as anyone in the victories as he helped raise astounding sums of money, he actively recruited numerous excellent nominees, and he helped each of them navigate the rocky shoals of difficult campaigns, a tough task which would prove vital in a race for Majority Leader, as will be seen.

Anyway, this all illustrates how valuable Schumer has been to Senate Democratic efforts, and in turn how respected he now is within his caucus.  He is a major player on both politics and policy, and his numerous titles and hats are demonstrative of this.  This makes Schumer uniquely positioned to run for Majority Leader should Reid lose.  Generally, if a senator were to run against the whip, barring unusual circumstances, he or she would be unsuccessful against a number two who has “waited their turn.”  Given Schumer nearly-unprecedented position within the Democratic caucus, he is a rare such senator who can credibly challenge a whip from below the hierarchy.  In other words, Sen. Schumer has the power base and political chits to make a real, not token run for the top leadership position should it open up.

Schumer and the freshman

We can see that Schumer could run credibly, but two more important questions remain: can he actually win and would he run?  The answer to both inquiries is yes, and we will address the initial one first.  Schumer can win precisely because of his respected, unusual, and powerful slot within his caucus today.  In layman’s terms, he is not your run-of-the-mill, overly-ambitious pol who wants to ascend to Leadership but cannot make the case to make the jump to his colleagues (see Dodd, Christopher and his various dalliances with Leadership openings).  So, where would Schumer’s votes come from in a head-to-head with Durbin?  Let’s see if we can flesh out some answers.

Before we begin, however, it is important to note of how difficult it is to predict how individual members will vote in a private, internal race.  For one thing, members do not like to reveal publicly how they will vote in any internal matter, and a contest between two well-liked colleagues might be at the top of that list.  Senators will literally be hiding under their desks until the fight is over out of fear of alienated either nominee.  Additionally, trying to gauge how a member will vote in such a contest is incredibly difficult because of factors and opinions that may be completely unknown.  For example, outside of senators themselves and senior aides who are there physically, reading how good or how poor individual relationships between members are is almost impossible, and is often based solely on parsed and vague statements or actions which might mean nothing.  By themselves, a member may hold a feud against his colleague for some reason known only to him from ages ago.  Members are petty, proud people, and they can base important decisions on matters that might seem useless.  Grudges between politicians can exist for decades and can decide votes in matters like internal elections, so trying to craft any semblance of a vote-count is a fool’s errand.  Nonetheless, since most political discussion is based on speculation, we will go forward and try to at least draw out several conclusions on how members might vote in a Durbin-Schumer fight.

Schumer’s first base of support is obvious: senators that he helped elect in 2006 and 2008.  As mentioned already, as head of the DSCC in those cycles, Schumer helped recruit, prop up, and ultimately elect over a dozen of the current senators, so he has had a close relationship with each of them before they even got to the Senate.  But his standing with new members goes beyond this.  In his position, Schumer talked to these members when they were mere candidates every single day.  He acted as their best friend, shrewdest adviser, most brutal critic, and emotional masseuse as they went through the ups and downs of brutal months long campaigns.  He was with all of them from the beginning until the end, and in addition to playing a vital role in getting each of them elected, he formed a key, close bond with them that collectively made them all closer to Schumer than any other senator outside of their home state.

This list includes Ben Cardin (a former House member who was elected in Maryland in a closer-than-expected contest which Schumer waded the DSCC heavily into), Amy Klobuchar (who won an open Minnesota seat by a wide margin), Claire McCaskill (who won a very close race against an incumbent in Missouri; the DSCC spent big on her behalf), Jon Tester (who won a razor-close election over a three-term incumbent in Montana), Bob Menendez (Schumer’s neighbor in New Jersey, Menendez got help from the DSCC), Sherrod Brown (who defeated an incumbent senator in Ohio, was strongly recruited by Schumer), Sheldon Whitehouse, Bob Casey and Jim Webb (both of whom defeated incumbents, and both Schumer supported in their initial primaries to one degree or another to ensure they were the general election nominees), Mark Begich (who Schumer recruited from the start to run a tough campaign in Alaska), Mark Udall (who Schumer recruited from the start), Al Franken (who won a 312-vote victory in Minnesota), Jeanne Shaheen (who Schumer heavily recruited to run in 2007), Tom Udall (who decided to initially stay in the House, but ultimately ran for Senate in large part because of intense lobbying by Schumer), Kay Hagan (who benefited from the DSCC’s largesse, particularly in the form of an excellent commercial which helped single-handedly turn the tide in the race), Jeff Merkley (who Schumer actively recruited and strongly supported in a tough Democratic primary), and Mark Warner (who won big in Virginia).

From this list, there are 17 members who had close relationships with Chuck Schumer during their campaigns before they even made it to the Senate.  Several of them — Bob Casey, Jim Webb, Jeff Merkley — Schumer played a big role in getting through a primary or initial stages, and the rest Schumer provided crucial support to in one form or another.  This does not mean that all of them would back Schumer in an internal election against the whip; that is impossible for us to know — and they probably do not know right now, either.  Still, it is very fair to say that at least a majority of these senators, if not more, would be predisposed to back Schumer because of their close ties to him dating back to their campaigns.  For Schumer to start with this kind of base — remember: it will only take a bare majority of the Democratic caucus to win the Majority Leader job, however many Democratic senators there are immediately following the 2010 elections — would present a major complication to Sen. Durbin.

Let’s move on to the ideological considerations that would be at play in a leadership fight.

Liberal vs. slightly less liberal

Another complication of the race would be how it would be framed, or for that matter, not framed.  Generally, in a fight like this, the stakes and lines can be drawn politically, with one combatant being the perceived liberal or moderate or conservative, and the other appearing more to the left or to the right of his opponent.  In a Durbin-Schumer fight, such lines would be much more nuanced, and this would be to the detriment of Durbin.  This is because both senators are basically liberal and at the left end of their party’s political spectrum, but Schumer is a little less so.  To wit, let’s consult each senator’s National Journal liberal-conservative scores from 2000 to 2006 (the 2007/08 scores are in the latest Almanac of American Politics, but not available online yet).

Durbin
2000: 90/7 (economic issues)–79/0 (social issues)–86/12 (foreign affairs issues)
2001: 88/9–60/36–87/3
2002:
2003: 93/0–79/15–79/14
2004: 93 liberal/7 conservative (overall averaged score)
2005: 94/5–77/18–86/13
2006: 87/0–95/4–95/2

Schumer
2000: 84/11 (economic)–79/0 (social)–72/15 (foreign affairs)
2001: 79/19–70/20–74/14
2002:
2003: 82/10–63/35–72/26
2004: 72 liberal/28 conservative (overall averaged score)
2005: 85/14–77/18–66/29
2006: 71/28–80/14–67/29

What do these numbers mean?  Simply that while both Durbin and Schumer are very liberal pretty much across the board, Schumer is closer to the middle than Durbin, particularly on economic and foreign affairs issues.  It would be fair to say, at least based on these scores that Durbin is at the left end of his party, while Schumer is slightly more centrist.

This matters because even though Schumer would be running more as an “insurgent” (the word is imperfect here, yes, but he would be insurgent in that in running for Leader, he would be asking his colleagues to skip Durbin in “the order” of leadership, and thus implicitly violate cherished protocol), he would be able to claim the mantle as more centrist and moderate.  This would allow him to appeal to the numerous moderate/conservative Democratic senators from red states who would be nervous to vote for the very-liberal Durbin to be their leader and spokesman.  Thus, Schumer would be able to appeal to both a swath of liberal freshman members as well as moderates and conservatives who might prefer the more moderate choice, even if Durbin and Schumer are both abashed liberal politicians on the whole.

This begets a fair question: in a leadership fight between a super-liberal and a less liberal within a Democratic caucus, how can the less liberal guy win?  This is a great question; indeed, while the Democratic caucus is filled with moderates from red states like Louisiana, Nebraska, and North Dakota, the caucus is still controlled by liberal members from blue states.  Given this obvious fact, how could the more liberal member lose, especially when he is number two in the whole group?  The answer lies in the fact that while Durbin is clearly the more liberal of the two, especially on economic and foreign matters, that does not mean he would automatically be able to collect all the liberals to his side while Schumer would get the moderates and conservatives in his camp.

This is what coalition-building is all about and exactly what we have been alluding to so far: a vote in an internal election will depend on numerous factors like personal relationships, past financial contributions, seniority, personality, effectiveness, etc.  That Durbin is the more liberal of the two will surely help garner him votes with some liberals, but his policy differences with Schumer are in the end quite slight, and aside from the died-in-the-wool liberal and conservative warriors, members themselves are complex creatures who do not base decisions like these solely on policy differences, much in the same way that many voters vote for candidates for reasons besides policy agreements and disagreements.

Given this fact, the ultimate inquiry here is obvious: how will the policy record differences between Sens. Durbin and Schumer ultimately impact how individual senators vote in their contest?  In a nutshell, it will play a role in the matter, but only a strong role with a small number of members.  Durbin will get some votes because he is the more liberal of the two, but Schumer would get equal, if not greater aggregate support from moderate members from red states.  The advantage for Durbin will be negligible simply because of the complex calculus involved in leadership fights, where ideology is trumped by a slate of other factors.

For his part, Durbin could make an argument to counter this potential split.  When it comes to voting records and ideological labels, perception is not always reality, and simply because Durbin is actually more liberal does not mean that Schumer is perceived as the more centrist of the two.  Rather, a good argument can be made that Schumer is much more well-known both within the Washington Beltway and nationally as a spokesman for liberal issues.  There is not much doubt about this: while both men are fixtures on the Sunday morning talk-show circuit, Schumer is the louder voice of the two, and he more known nationally than Durbin, more because of personality than because of policy opinions.  Durbin could argue that he is a more low-key type of leader than Schumer, and that while he lacks his brashness, he also does not have Schumer’s strong personality to hinder his effectiveness.  Such an argument could advocate that Durbin would be more effective because he is not as identified with the take-no-prisoners brand of politics that Schumer embodies.

Ultimately, though, this would be a losing argument.  For one thing, despite Schumer’s brashness, it is impossible to question his effectiveness.  Apart from his tenure at the DSCC, he is also strongly effective on policy matters (as evident by his recent work on the health care bill and the public option — a subject we will return to at the end).  In fact, he might just be one of the Senate’s most effective legislators and plain advocates.  So any contention to the contrary would appear foolish. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of Reid’s defeat, it might not be Durbin’s best strategy to point to himself as the even-keeled choice in the mold of Harry Reid.

Durbin’s big advantage: seniority

All of this postulation in Schumer’s favor is not to say that Durbin is up a creek without a paddle; indeed, his candidacy will possess several key positive attributes, mostly notably that as whip, he is properly next in line for the Majority Leader job, while Schumer is right below him on the pecking order.  This line of argument should gain the attention and tacit support of numerous older senators who themselves possess greater seniority, and thus may feel threatened by allowing Schumer to move out of order and up ahead of the whip.

As far as personalities go, the difference between the two men could make a big difference, particularly as they appeal to both young and old bulls.  While more liberal across the board, Durbin speaks in much lower tones than Schumer, and comes across as more earnest and subdued.  Both men speak passionately on what they care about, but Durbin is not as brash about it.  Schumer is much louder, and can come across as more obnoxious with a Brooklyn accent thicker than a corned beef sandwich at the Second Avenue Deli and with a lust for self-promotion that may be unrivaled in all of Congress — which is quite a pronouncement.  While all of his colleagues respect and are indebted to Schumer for his hard work, the guess here is that his publicity-seeking ways and fast rise through the caucus have ruffled at least some feathers in the caucus.  And the feathers most likely to be ruffled are those that feel the most threatened by a younger upstart: committee chairman and senior members who most respect the established order of seniority and doing things precisely because they have respected the order’s precepts and are thus feel protected by them.  Schumer is a doer, someone who makes things happen around him.  He is the precise type of person who does not like to “wait his turn.”  It is these latent feelings which should play to Durbin’s advantage among some members.

Men like Max Baucus, Robert Byrd, Daniel Inouye, Jay Rockefeller, Kent Conrad, Dianne Feinstein, and Jeff Bingaman are all very cautious, quiet members who could feel threatened not just by a Schumer candidacy, but by his very persona.  Several of these men and women are of an older school where comity played a slightly greater role in legislative affairs than it does today.  As a result, they might not favor making a hardened political brawler their leader and spokesman over a more deliberate option like Dick Durbin.  To be sure, they may respect and admire Schumer — and even love his penchant for bare-knuckle politics — but they could also be wary of him.

What do wary and threatened mean?  They mean that chairmen might be hesitant to back a Schumer bid because if Schumer is victorious, then the other tenets of seniority could go out the window and they could find themselves subject to future challenges by similar young, ambitious members who did not want to wait in line either.  Naturally, the selection process for chairmen is different from how caucus leaders are elected, with seniority playing an almost completely controlling roll in how chairman are elevated, but the principle remains: if Schumer could win over the guy who is next in line, a new principle could be formed and any senior member could find their power base at risk.

These names are examples, and we can’t know how they would all vote in an internal election.  There are many factors at play, but the reasoning here is that in the end, a majority of senior members and chairs like these would go with Durbin mainly to preserve the established order and keep Schumer, and by extension other similar members, in line to “wait their turn.”

Durbin’s surprising disadvantage: Obama

The one big factor we have not examined so far is probably the elephant in the room: President Barack Obama, formerly the junior senator from Illinois, and one of Dick Durbin’s very closest political friends.  We have so far avoided this issue because it is so big, but also because the view here on Obama’s role in a potential Senate leadership fight involving his friend Durbin will sound counter-intuitive to some.

Dick Durbin was Obama’s closest ally and strong advocate in the Senate from even before Obama was sworn in on January 3, 2005.  And when Obama decided to run for President, Durbin was the first senator in his corner, and for a while the only senator selling his candidacy as many of his colleagues quickly went over to the side of the favored Hillary Clinton.  Simply put, Durbin was and still is Obama’s top guy in the U.S. Senate, and the bond between the two is without question.  There is absolutely no doubt that Obama would love to see Durbin become the next Majority Leader should the job open up.  However, despite this desire, there are several complicating factors which would limit both what President Obama could do to elect Durbin within the caucus and how effective he would be.

If it is not clear already, internal elections are extremely complex events governed by many factors, some seen but many more unseen.  But more than anything else, they are formal affairs with unsaid but nevertheless controlling rules.  Perhaps the most important rule is that they are purely internal, to be decided solely by the senators themselves, and any outside pushing and lobbying is at best frowned upon and at worst an actual detriment.  Outside groups or individuals lobbying senators on an internal issue is strictly discouraged.  It is likely that regardless of how popular he is now or one year from now, or however well respected he is generally, this rule would apply fully to President Obama should he attempt to push senators to vote for Durbin to become Majority Leader.

Barack Obama is the most powerful figure in American politics and is the unquestioned leader of the Democratic Party until he leaves office.  He is also Dick Durbin’s close friend and most powerful ally, and would be pleased both personally and professionally to see Durbin become the Senate Leader because it would allow him to work directly with a friend and fellow Illinoisan in developing a longterm legislative agenda.  Yet, despite the feelings of the White House, Obama would be heavily constrained from making any overt endorsements of Durbin and in the end, Durbin would be have to be very careful to ask the President to work too hard on his behalf.  Should the whip decide to this, he would likely draw the ire of proud senators who would be angered by Obama’s meddling in their own election.  Older legislators would be particularly irked by anything they construed as executive encroachment on internal legislative movements.

Over the last several decades, the executive office has become much more powerful in large part by chipping away at the power and the prestige of the legislature, and smart institutional players know this.  Strong lobbying by the President on behalf of his friends would be seen as another attempt by the White House to weaken Congress’s power.  Should that happen, it could do more to hurt Durbin’s candidacy than help it.  It is for this reason that Durbin will likely not enlist the White House’s help in rustling up votes except in quiet, individial cases.  This race will be won behind closed doors, and by the combatants themselves as well as through the work of trusted lieutenants.  Durbin could ask the President and individuals like White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel to lobby select members who might be persuaded by a call from the President (read: freshman), but he would have to tread very lightly.  Senators remember well the fresh tenure of Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist, who was basically installed by Karl Rove after the White House helped usher Trent Lott out of leaderships in that Frist was a White House House puppet and rubber stamp for President Bush’s legislative wishes.

Additionally, whether or not Obama is particularly popular in the immediate aftermath of the midterm elections, Durbin will face the problem of countering arguments that Illinois would become too powerful if Durbin were elevated to Leader.  While Schumer could not say loudly that electing Durbin would empower Illinois at the expense of other states, he would not need to; the implication would be clear.  This would especially be true if Obama were at a lower point politically.  If Obama is riding high and Democrats do better than expected in the midterms, the equation might be different, but it is probable that Obama will still face the same hurdles in working on Durbin’s behalf.  In sum, Obama and his team will have to be extremely subtle in how they wade into a leadership fight, if at all.

Following the (PAC) money

Going beyond these more opaque factors, the issue of money is always front-and-center in politics, and this case is no different.

Let’s look at a potential Durbin-Schumer match from another angle, namely by looking at how each senator’s PAC and how they directed PAC funds to fellow (and future) senators.  As long-time Democratic leaders, both Durbin and Schumer have maintained robust PACs and they have used them to dole out cash to their colleagues over the years.  All grudges, loyalties, and personal machinations aside, how generous the two senators have been with their colleagues over the years will play an enormous role in how members would vote in a leadership contest.  PACs exist for the very reason of helping politicians aid their colleagues to build chits to be cashed later.

To that end, let’s summarize how much each man’s PAC has given in Senate contests, beginning in 2000 when both their PACs began to take off.

Impact PAC (Schumer): $726,000 total and $487,500 to likely 2011 senators

Prairie PAC (Durbin): $781,000 total and $462,500 to likely 2011 senators

That is a lot of money that both men have helped throw around to their colleagues, and it is a very close split between the two men.  Durbin, in his capacity as whip since late 2004 has outspent Schumer by a small margin overall, but by our estimations, Schumer has given just a bit more money to men and women who will be voting on the next Majority Leader (should Harry Reid lose next year and the 2010 races break as expected).

Let’s look at the men and women who will likely be in the Senate after the 2010 elections individually, and how each has gotten from Durbin and Schumer.  Note that a handful of stalwart senators like Herb Kohl and Dianne Feinstein, to name a couple, are missing from this list entirely.  This is because they are independently wealthy, and thus not in need of even token donations, and/or they are never in tight races which require the financial assistance of their deep-pocketed colleagues.

Akaka: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $0 ——————> DD+5K
Baucus: Durbin $30,000; Schumer $10,000 ——->DD+20K
Bayh: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $10,000————->CS+5K
Begich: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000 ——–>PUSH
Bingaman: Durbin $0; Schumer $2,500————–>CS+2.5K
Boxer: Durbin $20,000; Schumer $10,000———->DD+10K
Brown: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000———->PUSH
Byrd: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000————>PUSH
Cardin: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $5,000————>DD+5K
*R. Carnahan: Durbin $0; Schumer $10,000——–>CS+10K
Carper: Durbin $7,500; Schumer $0——————–>DD+7.5K
Casey: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000———–>PUSH
Conrad: Durbin $0; Schumer $5,000——————–>CS+5K
Dodd: Durbin $20,000; Schumer $20,000————->PUSH
Dorgan: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000———->PUSH
Feingold: Durbin $20,000; Schumer $10,000——–>DD+10K
Franken: Durbiin $25,000; Schumer $10,000——–>DD+15K
Gillibrand: Durbin $0; Schumer $20,000—————>CS+20K
Hagan: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000———–>PUSH
Harkin: Durbin $13,500; Schumer $10,000———–>DD+3.5K
*Hodes: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $5,000————>DD+5K
Inouye: Durbin $11,000; Schumer $10,000———–>DD+1K
Johnson: Durbin $20,000; Schumer $15,000———>DD+5K
Kerry: Durbin $0; Schumer $5,000———————–>CS+5K
Klobuchar: Durbin $0; Schumer $10,000—————>CS+10K
Landrieu: Durbin $31,000; Schumer $15,000———>DD+16K
Lautenberg: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $15,000—–>CS+5K
Leahy: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $10,000————–>CS+5K
Levin: Durbin $1,000; Schumer $10,000—————->CS+9K
Lieberman: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $0—————>DD+10K
Lincoln: Durbin $15,000; Schumer $10,000————>DD+5K
McCaskill: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000——–>PUSH
Menendez: Durbin $0; Schumer $5,000—————–>CS+5K
Mikulski: Durbin $2,000; Schumer $10,000————->CS+8K
Murray: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000————–>PUSH
Ben Nelson: Durbin $6,000; Schumer $15,000———>CS+9K
Bill Nelson: Durbin $7,000; Schumer $10,000———->CS+3K
Pryor: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $20,000—————->CS+10K
Reed: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000—————->PUSH
Rockefeller: Durbin $1,000; Schumer $10,000———>CS+9K
Sanders: Durbin $2,500; Schumer $5,000—————>CS+2.5K
Shaheen: Durbin $21,000; Schumer $15,000———–>DD+6K
Stabenow: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $10,000———–>CS+5K
Tester: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $5,000——————>PUSH
Mark Udall: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000——–>PUSH
Tom Udall: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000———>PUSH
Warner: Durbin $10,000; Schumer $10,000————->PUSH
Webb: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $10,000—————–>CS+5K
Whitehouse: Durbin $5,000; Schumer $10,000——–>CS+5K
Wyden: Durbin $1,000; Schumer $10,000—————>CS+9K

Interestingly, this information is both fascinating in what it says about giving between colleagues, and not very interesting in what it reveals about individual senatorial inclinations in an internal battle.

This PAC data is a living, breathing picture of two politicians who have grown stronger and more muscular as the years have gone by.  Both have grown into fundraising powerhouses, in large part because they are from two of the largest cities in the country — New York and Chicago — but their raising and spending so heavily on behalf of their colleagues and scores of failed candidates is revealing of two men who have long wanted to be important cogs in their caucus.  As we said just above, there is no other reason to start up a PAC and give to so many different people than to build up favors and IOUs for down the road.  A leadership brawl between the two men could be such a day, and it would put a lot of members in a bind, not just because of obvious friendship, but also because Schumer and Durbin have given so generously to basically the same people.

This list of 50 men and women should make up the super majority of whichever Democratic senators are still in office immediately following next year’s midterm elections when an new election for Leader would be held.  Of course, some might not make it, like Dodd, who is facing a tough re-election, or Hodes and Carnahan, who might not even get elected in the first place.  But that is immaterial; what matters is the patterns evident in the Impact and Prarie PACs giving to all of them.  And what we see is that for the most part, Durbin and Schumer gave a lot of money to the same people, so much so, that it is hard to discern much difference across the board.  This makes it much harder for one man to push great leverage on an individual member over his challenger.  In other words, if over his career, Durbin’s PAC has given $5,000 more to a colleague than Durbin, would that make the difference in getting the senator’s commitment of support in an internal fight?  That is extremely hard to say given the many other factors at play which we have pored over.

Of course, as we all know, senators are a stubborn, exquisitely petty lot, and there may well be some members who remember the $2,500 Schumer gave in 2001 while Durbin gave zip, and vice-versa, and these kinds of below-the-surface resentments will undoubtedly control some votes and commitments.

Glancing over the list above, the numbers that stick out are those to senators which eclipse $10,000 one way or the other: particularly Baucus, Landrieu, Carper, Feingold and Franken in Durbin’s favor, and Gillibrand, Klobuchar, and Pryor in Durbin’s favor.  These big gifts will likely play a role in each senator’s decision of who to support for Leader.

Developing a scoresheet

Given the numerous variables at play in an internal leadership race, it is absolutely impossible to craft an accurate scorecard of how senators will vote in a Durbin-Schumer fight.  There are relationships and feuds and friendships we have no idea about which will control votes.  Some senators will lose that we do not anticipate and others will win that we never expected.  Still, given that this entire discussion is speculative by its very nature, why not take things one step further and try to tease out how some senators who will be in office after the midterms next year will vote?

Daniel Akaka (Hawaii).  The guess here is that as a senior member and the embodiment of the collegial, slow clubbiness of the Senate, he goes with Durbin.
Max Baucus (Montana).  Durbin has given a fortune to Baucus, and as a senior member and longtime chair, Baucus may feel threatened by Schumer’s powerplay.  Durbin vote.
Evan Bayh (Indiana).  On the one hand, he is a midwesterner, but on the other he is both young and moderate.  No idea.
Mark Begich (Alaska).  Schumer was Begich’s number one recruiter to run in 2008, and he definitely became close to him over the brutal contest (in which Begich won by 1 percent with lots of DSCC ads).  Likely Schumer vote.
Michael Bennet (Colorado).  He may not survive 2010; if he does, no clue on how he votes.
Jeff Bingaman (New Mexico).  Another senior member and chair, the guess here is that he does not want to rock the boat and sticks with Durbin.
Barbara Boxer (California).  Durbin has given generously to Boxer over the years, and she is one of the chamber’s most liberal members.  But she is also a loud, brash type, more in line with Schumer’s leadership style.  Additionally, the fact that both she and Schumer are Jewish is not meaningless.  Schumer vote.
Sherrod Brown (Ohio).  Schumer and he likely got close over the 2006 cycle, and Schumer helped recruit him.  But Brown is liberal and he may want a midwestern leader in charge more than a senator who is close to Wall Street.
Alex Giannoulis (Illinois).  Assuming the young state treasurer wins next year over Mark Kirk, he is a lock to back Durbin.
Robert Byrd (West Virginia).  The old man is all about procedure and he would not vote to elect the number three over the number two.  Durbin backer.
Maria Cantwell (Washington).  No idea.
Ben Cardin (Maryland).  Schumer helped push him over the top in a surprisingly-tight race in 2006.  He is also Jewish.
Tom Carper (Delaware).  Personality-wise, Carper is the exact opposite of Schumer.  Durbin has also given him good financial backing in the past.
Bob Casey (Pennsylvania).  Schumer worked hard to recruit Casey to take on Rick Santorum, and he helped clear out the primary field for him.  Casey will be with Schumer.
Martha Coakley (Massachusetts).  No clue.  She could follow Kerry’s lead or she could do something else.
Kent Conrad (North Dakota).  Another taciturn pol and chairman.  Being from the Great Plains, hard to see him opposing Durbin.
Chris Dodd (Connecticut).  If Dodd survives next year, and he should after a tough race, his is a tough vote to forecast.  Heck, he might even jump in himself!
Byron Dorgan (North Dakota).  This one is tough to peg, but let’s say he follows Conrad.
Dick Durbin (Illinois).  Duh.
Russ Feingold (Wisconsin).  Very hard call, but given his strong liberalism and midwestern roots, let’s say Durbin.
Dianne Feinstein (California).  Absolutely no idea.
Lee Fisher (Ohio).  Assuming he wins, he could vote for either.
Al Franken (Minnesota).  Durbin has given more to him than Schumer so far, but the DSCC was kind to Franken.  Franken is a smart, combative New York Jew at heart.  That clinches it.
Kirsten Gillibrand (New York).  A mortal lock to back her patron Schumer.
Paul Hodes (New Hampshire).  If he wins next year, and that’s a big if, he would back Schumer.
Kay Hagan (North Carolina).  Another Schumer DSCC recruit, Hagan would go with Schumer.
Tom Harkin (Iowa).  Liberal, midwesterner who cares most about agriculture, and a chairman.  Harkin is a natural Durbin vote.
Daniel Inouye (Hawaii).  To be honest, Inouye will likely retire in 2010 when he will be 86.  His replacement…who knows?  But if he stays, he is a likely Durbin vote.
Tim Johnson (South Dakota).  No clue.
Beau Biden (Delaware).  This pre-supposes that he beats Mike Castle. The guess is that Obama will tell Biden and Biden will tell his son to vote for Durbin.
John Kerry (Massachusetts).  No idea.
Amy Klobuchar (Minnesota).  She became close to Schumer in 2006 when she was recruited to run for Senate.  She is a likely Schumer boaster.
Herb Kohl (Wisconsin).  No idea how the old man will vote.
Mary Landrieu (Louisiana).  Durbin has given a lot to her over the years, but she is moderate and unpredictable.
Frank Lautenberg (New Jersey).  An old Schumer ally.
Patrick Leahy (Vermont).  Very liberal and an old chairman, he would go with Durbin, the betting here says.
Carl Levin (Michigan).  Absolutely no idea.
Joe Lieberman (Connecticut).  See Levin.
Blanche Lincoln (Arkansas).  Ditto.
Claire McCaskill (Missouri).  Hard to say, but she is close to the White House and a midwesterner.  Then again, Schumer helped recruit and back her and was instrumental in her winning.  Unclear.
Bob Menendez (New Jersey).  Schumer helped install him at the DSCC.  He’s a very close ally.
Jeff Merkley (Oregon).  See Casey.  Schumer recruited him, and pulled him through a close primary.  Hard to see him backing Durbin.
Barbara Mikulski (Maryland).  An old-line senator, but also brash and boisterous.  Let’s guess Schumer.
Patty Murray (Washington).  Murray is right below Schumer in leadership, so if she is smart she should back him because it would put her in line to be whip.  Could go either way.
Ben Nelson (Nebraska).  Schumer has been with the Benator since 2000 (Schumer’s PAC gave to Nelson during his first race).  Members don’t forget that.
Bill Nelson (Florida).  The moderate Nelson seems like a Schumer vote.
Mark Pryor (Arkansas).  The moderate Pryor is close to Schumer on business issues, so we will guess he will go with Chuck.
Jack Reed (Rhode Island).  No.  Darn.  Idea.
Jay Rockefeller (West Virginia).  Rockefeller is a chairman and a longtime member.  He should be a Durbin vote.
Bernie Sanders (Vermont).  The most liberal member could go either way.
Chuck Schumer (New York).  Duh.
Jeanne Shaheen (New Hampshire).  Schumer was giving to her in 2002, and he helped recruit her in 2008.  She will go with him.
Debbie Stabenow (Michigan).  ?
Jon Tester (Montana).  Tester is a guy who could vote for either, and Baucus will surely lobby him for Durbin, but Schumer helped put him over the top in 2006.  Unclear.
Mark Udall (Colorado).  Another DSCC success story, and a likely vote for Schumer.
Tom Udall (New Mexico).  Schumer had enormous influence in convincing Udall to run and then electing him.
Mark Warner (Virginia).  No idea.
Jim Webb (Virginia).  See Casey, Merkley and T. Udall.  Schumer took a risk and backed Webb in his primary, helping him win 53-47.  He then backed him heavily in the general in a race decided by 0.4%.
Sheldon Whitehouse (Rhode Island).  Schumer and he became close during 2006 when Whitehouse edged out Lincoln Chafee.  Schumer.
Ron Wyden (Oregon).  Who knows?

This amateur tally finds 23 votes for Schumer, 15 votes for Durbin, and the rest to one degree or another are unclear to us.  Even if this is even close to accurate, it is a bad omen for Durbin.  If the man next in line on the leadership ladder has only a little over a dozen likely-to-sure votes, he probably will not be able to cobble together a majority of the caucus.  Again, a great many of these are based on much speculation and intuition, so take them for what you will.  But the general point one should take away from the matter is that Schumer will have a lot of support against the whip to start.

Would Schumer run against his friend and housemate Durbin?

Admittedly, this question is difficult to answer given how long Durbin and Schumer have known and worked with each other (they were together in the House for 13 years and in the Senate since 1999); in point of fact, the two men have lived in the same house together for years (the well-known “animal house” owned by Rep. George Miller, which has been occupied by House and Senate members for decades).  At first glance, it would tough to fathom this kind of campaign materializing given the relationship between the two men.  But in the end, one need only remember that this is politics, and these are nakedly political animals we are talking about.

Look above one more time at those PAC numbers.  A senator like Chuck Schumer does not toil for thousands of hours traveling to fundraisers in most of the 50 states, spending his weekends in places like Des Moines and Reno, taking on a draining job like running the DSCC, and accepting leadership positions created just for him just because he likes to see all his titles on the door (though, assuredly he does like this).  Schumer is a politician, perhaps the most talented politician around today, and he has taken on all of these responsibilities and worked so hard to help his colleagues over the years for the sole purpose of one day contending to be the leader of his political tribe.  Schumer more than anyone else has to know that succeeding in politics is about timing and opportunity, and for one to continue rising up the ladder overly equally hungry and shrewd pols, one has to seize an opportunity when it presents itself because it may never come by again.

Late last year, longtime liberal Rep. Henry Waxman launched a bold challenge against more moderate Rep. John Dingell, the aged chairman of the powerful House Energy and Commerce Committee.  Waxman ran against Dingell despite the fact that Dingell had nearly 20 years of seniority on him.  Waxman wisely recognized this precept about grabbing opportunity when it arises, and he was successful in toppling the chairman, a man who had once been the most feared pol on Capitol Hill.  It is easy to imagine Schumer nodding in silent appreciation of Waxman’s gambit, and not because he is more in line with Waxman ideologically and politically, but because Schumer saw Waxman taking a big political risk while the window was open.

Sure, Schumer could sit back and let Durbin become Leader, as he would become whip unopposed in caucus and he could sit and wait for Durbin to retire.  Indeed, Durbin is today on the verge of turning 65, and he would be a year older if he moved into the Leader’s office.  Schumer is almost 59 (his birthday is two days after Durbin’s in late November) and he could bide his time until Durbin decided to hang it up.  But smart politics does not work like that.  Durbin could decide to remain Leader for 20 years, Schumer could slip on a banana peel, or most likely Democrats could lose control of the Senate before Schumer gets to the top and they could hold onto it for 20 years.  As a result, why would Schumer wait?

Schumer first ran for office fresh out of law school and was elected to the New York State Assembly in his early 20s.  He got to Congress when he was 30.  In the House, he patiently bided his time for 18 long years until he saw the right opportunity.  When he finally made the leap to the upper chamber, he faced a very difficult primary field, which he navigated brilliantly, and then he had to tangle with a three-term senator who also chaired the Banking Committee, and was as shamelessly self-promoting and hard-working as Schumer himself. Nonetheless, Schumer easily dispatched the incumbent by 11 points.

If Harry Reid loses next fall, Chuck Schumer will run for Majority Leader, regardless of whether Dick Durbin runs, and Durbin surely will.  It is in Schumer’s very DNA that he will make the race.

The only way to see Schumer not running is if he believed he did not have the votes or if he were to cut a deal with Durbin.  Perhaps Schumer could become whip, and Durbin would assure Schumer of his backing to chair the one committee Schumer has always wanted to help: Judiciary.  Judiciary is the perfect platform for the outspoken Schumer, who is a smart lawyer who fancies himself as a constitutional expert.  It is Congress’s most partisan committee by far, and it is the committee which gets to debate — out in the open — the most contentious culture war issues year-in and year-out.  In many hearings, as any CSPAN fan knows, Schumer is always on the dais, jousting with Republicans and making a strong and reasoned case for a particular bill or judicial nominee.

In short, Schumer covets the job.  The one obstacle in the way would be the members in front of Schumer on the committee.  To begin, Leahy would have to give up the gavel, which would only happen if he got a better gavel.  This could happen, but only if the current Appropriations chairman, Daniel Inouye retires in 2010.  If that occurs, Leahy would be next in line and he would take it, thereby opening the Judiciary chairmanship.  The two senators next in line — Kohl and Feinstein — might both want the high-profile job, but both could be legitimately passed over because neither of them are lawyers or politically tough enough to take on the job of heading the partisan panel.  The biggest challenge would be in jumping Schumer over Russ Feingold, who would come after Feinstein.  Feingold would love the job too, and he would put up a big stink if Schumer were allowed to leap-frog over him.  In fact, fellow members could even put the kibosh on it.  But this is probably the best deal which Schumer would take in order to not run for Leader.  As whip and chairman of his favorite committee, that might be enough to keep him out.  Whether or Durbin could make the deal is unclear, but the guess here is that he would want to avoid any race with Schumer.

Conclusion

This analysis is based on a plethora of speculation and eventualities which not even come to pass.  Harry Reid may not lose next year, in which case much of this will be moot; at least until Reid leaves the position voluntarily in 2012 following bad losses in the 2012 Senate elections.  But the chances of Reid losing today are good, and sifting through the potential for a fascinating leadership fight between two politicians at the top of their game is incredibly enlightening.

In short, there are many factors that would come into play in determining how individual senators would vote in such a contest.  Personal relationships, past PAC donations, ideological matches, regional interests, lingering feuds, overriding political considerations, and dozens of other issues hidden from the surface will play a role in how the Democratic caucus would function in selecting a new Majority Leader.  Consequently we can only guess and speculate how a race would turn out, but we can still make reasoned assumptions.

Dick Durbin would run for the job because he is next line and there is no other reason that he is whip than to become Majority Leader when the job comes available.  Schumer is a brilliant and seasoned pol, and he will likely run because the opportunity is there and he may not have another chance again.  Schumer will have a great shot at winning because he has given out as money as Durbin to his colleagues has over the years, and he will have big pools of votes in the Senate freshman, moderates, and those seeking a bold and brash leader who gets things done.  Indeed, should a health care bill pass with any public option, Schumer will get a lion’s share of the credit, as he has been one of the staunchest and most unyielding advocates for a public option.  His star both in political and policy matters may never be higher than it is now, and he has to know that.

Chuck Schumer may not beat Dick Durbin head-to-head because of the power of procedure in the Senate and President Obama’s wishes, but many key factors appear in his favor today, and as result, he would be foolish not to pursue the job should it open up.  If he does, he will probably pull it off and become Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer come January 2011.

The last few months have been trying times for Jersey’s well-deserved not-so-sterling reputation.  No, not because we cleaned things up, but rather because other states began dealing with similar misdeeds.  Notably, Alaska became a hotbed of corruption, and saw the conviction of numerous high-ranking state legislators and leaders as they became caught up in a wide-ranging bribery scheme which drew comparisons to New Jersey corruption from Anchorage neophytes not cultured in the art of political criminality.  Of course, seasoned cynics like myself guffawed at these comparisons; indeed, such analogies would be akin to saying that Tonya Harding and Al Capone are the same class of criminal: mere foolishness!  Consequently, I slept easily at night, comfortable that no one could reasonably try to take away my state’s cherished Most Corrupt status.

But things all changed with the arrest of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich.  Immediately following Blagojevich’s arrest for attempting to sell Barack Obama’s Senate seat to the highest bidder, overzealous reporters and newspapers all breathlessly condemned the disgraced Blago and said that Illinois was in a class by itself, proclaiming the Land of Lincoln as America’s Most Corrupt State.

As Americans sat riveted by the transcripts of Blago’s conversations, disgusted with the governor’s behavior, I was appalled, but for a far different reason.  I wondered how on earth could anyone could call Illinois more corrupt than New Jersey?  Hadn’t they heard of Robert Torricelli’s free suits, Jim McGreevy’s inappropriate appointments, or Sharpe James’ discounted property rates to his paramour?  What about the fact that bushels of powerful Jersey pols had been convicted in Federal court over the last several years?  The gall.  The absolute nerve.  I was outraged that my state was again being slighted.

Immediately, I began a campaign to educate people about New Jersey’s unassailable corruption credentials and therefore regain my state’s (dis)honor.  I began calling friends, making blog posts, and e-mailing newspaper writers, all to spread the word that that New Jersey was still the #1 state for corruption and Soprano-esque illegal hijinks.  I screeched repeatedly that Blago’s actions were nothing special, that New Jersey Assemblyman make similar deals every day — often before breakfast!

Alas, despite my best efforts, nothing changed.  No media or newspaper retractions were printed, stories covering Blagojevich continued to call his state America’s most corrupt, and once-prideful Jerseyites began to hang their heads in complete shame, unable to even muster comebacks to Dirty Jersey quips from friends.  Personally, I comforted myself by reading and re-reading Torricelli’s epic farewell speech, telling myself that one day, Jersey would get its status back.

While the wait was difficult, that glorious day of vindication came on Thursday, as over 300 Federal agents descended on my fair state and rounded up and arrested dozens of state political officials and assorted community leaders in a spectacle which could never be duplicated outside the contours of the famed Jersey Turnpike.  The circus had it all: crooked mayors, stealing assemblymen, rabbis, $97,000 stuffed in a box of Apple Jacks for an official on the take, purportedly the nation’s largest organ-selling scheme, money laundering by Hasidim out of Jewish charities and synagogues, and the 87 year-old head of the Syrian Jews in the U.S. hauled in looking more bewildered than Donovan McNabb after seeing a Giants’ pass rush.

In the end, there were so many arrestees — 44 in all, at least as of Thursday — that the Feds had to stack them in buses to get them to the courthouse.  In California a scene like this would evoke thoughts of the Oscars; in Jersey, it was a symbol of our unique political talents.  Maybe we should consider trademarking the Jersey Oscars and them The Hagues!

I ask you, where else will you ever see that?  Illinois?  In their dreams.  Louisiana?  Huey Long is dead and Edwin Edwards is locked up, baby.  Alaska?  Come on, the Last Frontier is but a small fawn in the national corruption ecosystem.  The answer, my friends is: Only in Jersey.

Our official state slogan is “New Jersey: Come See for Yourself,” and nothing could be more appropriate.   For the strands of political corruption that exist in New Jersey are so rare outside the swamps of East Rutherford and the dens of Trenton and Hudson County, that witnessing New Jersey corruption is like seeing a species of bird which only lives deep within the jungles of New Guinea, almost never seen by the naked eyes of mere mortals.  It quite literally has to be seen by non-New Jerseyeans to be believed.

As a lifelong Jerseayean, I have seen it all.  In the last few years, we have had three state senators — out of just 40 in the whole legislature — be convicted.  Just a couple of years ago, the honorable assemblyman from my home district, was convicted for taking bribes.  What did he say on tape when asked if the envelope bribe containing $5,000 was enough?  Channeling the Kool Aid Man he exclaimed: “Oh yeah!”

And make no mistake, corruption in Jersey has nothing to do with race, religion, ethnicity, or party as we have has a veritable cornucopia of corruption that crosses all lines of decency. We have corrupt whites from Essex, corrupt black men from Camden, corrupt Hispanics from Jersey City, corrupt reverends from Irvington, corrupt rabbis from Deal, corrupt Italians from Paramus, corrupt Irishmen from New Brunswick, corrupt 32 year-olds from Hoboken, corrupt 87 year-olds from New York, corrupt Democrats from Atlantic City and corrupt Republicans from Ocean.  Our state has crossed boundaries of equality that other states could only dream of.  Indeed, a place can truly be considered equal when officials of all colors and creeds can commit corrupt acts with impunity.  Such a people, and such a place are quintessential New Jersey.  Yes We Can!

What Chris Christie called a “tragic” day for New Jersey is nothing of the kind; it is a day to celebrate.  These might be the golden years of recent New Jersey corruption, and all political observers and admirers should bask in the incredibly rich tapestry of corruption that New Jersey has provided our nation for decades.  We might not see it again until … maybe next month.  Frankly, we have seen such excitement in Jersey since Christie Whitman dedicated the old I-295 Howard Stern Rest Stop.

I, for one am brimming with pride now that New Jersey is back as America’s unquestioned Most Corrupt State, and no one can deny us of that title.  What a great day for New Jersey and New Jerseyeans, and really, a great day for America.

Take that Illinois.

Jersey electoral politics are not terribly complex.  Democrats are able to repeatedly win statewide office by running up enormous margins in Essex (second biggest county), Middlesex (third), Hudson (fifth), Union (seventh) and Camden (eighth) Counties to wash away Republican advantages in the more conservative, but much smaller counties (Hunterdon, Morris, Ocean, Sussex, Warren).  Even in bad years, Republicans can rely on winning their counties but ultimately falling well short by registering pitiful returns in Essex and Hudson in the northern part of the state.  However, for several reasons, this year looks to be different, and Christie’s team seems to know it.

First, Corzine is extremely weak.  A combination of the bad national economy, New Jersey’s horrible taxes, and his overall inability to connect to voters have come together to make Corzine one of the most endangered Democratic incumbents in the nation this year — or next year.  To wit, let’s take a gander at the governor’s personal scores as reflected in the last few polls of the governor’s race:

Quinnipiac (5/20) and (6/10)

Corzine approvals: 38/53 (-15) —> 35/53 (-18)

Christie approvals: 33/11 (+22) —> 36/16 (+20)

Head-to-head: Christie 45, Corzine 38 —> Christie 50, Corzine 40

Rasmussen (6/3)

Head-to-head: Christie 51, Corzine 38

DailyKos/R2K (5/28)

Corzine favorable: 36/55 (-19)

Christie favorables: 38/15 (+23)

Head-to-head: Christie 46, Corzine 39

We could spend time parsing the crosstabs of Quinnipiac and R2K, but we don’t need to; the broader point is obvious: Corzine’s numbers are in the toilet, and as an incumbent in a strongly Democratic state, they look even worse.  An incumbent cannot survive with numbers like these, and given that many of them have been in place in some form for months, Corzine may not be able to reverse them in time for November.

Even Corzine’s primary performance raises alarm bells.  As documented by New Jersey’s legendary blogger Wally Edge, despite facing a handful of unknown and unfunded (in other words, possessing and spending absolutely no money) primary opponents, Corzine ended up registering under 70% of the vote in eight counties.  Sure, he got the enormous margins he expected in Essex, Passiac, Union, and Hudson, but he got 67% in Middlesex (in central Jersey) and just 70% in Camden.  That is not good, and it portends badly for the governor.

Christie understands just how weak Corzine is, and is going for the jugular as a result.  I think two quotes well speak to his position.   First, from his top campaign strategist:

Michael DuHaime, Mr. Christie’s top strategist, said that merely holding down Mr. Corzine’s margins in urban areas could be decisive. “You’ll know if we won on election night not by how much we win Ocean and Sussex by,” he said, naming Republican strongholds in the outer suburbs, “but how much do we lose Hudson, Essex and Camden by.”

Christie does not need to win these counties to get elected, all he needs is for Corzine to lose just small segments of his base counties to put him in grave electoral danger. Can Christie gets votes in places like Essex?  Most observers would say ‘no’ right off the bat, but this quote from a key county operative really stood out at me in an article from a couple weeks ago:

And even before the polls closed Tuesday, Corzine was working to shore up political loose ends at a breakfast meeting in West Orange with key Democratic leaders from Essex County.

According to those at the private gathering at Pal’s Cabin, the governor said he needed to run up vote totals in Essex similar to those he scored in 2005 when he took the county 131,000 votes to Republican candidate Doug Forrester’s 45,700. The leaders had bad news for Corzine.

“Of course he would like to get the same number of votes he got four years ago. That’s our goal,” said Essex County Executive Joe DiVincenzo. “But turnout is not going to be what it was. You’re starting from behind. For him to be successful, there has to be improvement of everything on the campaign.”

Let me first point out that Pal’s Cabin is one of my favorite all time restaurants: it is one of those places where you will always get a good meal.  If you are ever in West Orange, New Jersey check it out.  Anyway, this quotation is of huge significance.  As county executive, DiVincenzo is one of the most powerful leaders in Essex County.  For him to throw cold water on Corzine’s aim to rack up big margins in the state’s bluest county is incredibly important.  If I was a Corzine adviser and I read that article, I would not have been able to finish my Frosted Flakes that morning.  Simply put: Corzine’s high negatives endanger his ability to get the margins he needs in North Jersey to win re-election.

Second, I think that Christie is just a better candidate than the dreck the New Jersey Republican Party has been running for the last 10-to-15 years.  As the state’s top Federal prosecutor over the last eight years, Christie obtained convictions for dozens of corrupt state pols, and his name was splashed glowingly across the state many times since his appointment.  He has an excellent political pedigree, and despite his selection by President Bush, it will be harder to tarnish him that it was to bring down such “heavyweights” as Dick Zimmer, Doug Forrester, Bret Schundler, Bob Franks, and Tom Kean Jr.  Consequently, I view him as the GOP’s best statewide candidate in Jersey in a long, long time.

Third, I just think this year is different.  I know, I know: people say that all the time for all kinds of races.  Furthermore, it is conventional wisdom in the blogosphere and across national political circles that Jersey always looks close, but come October, the voters will come home to the Democratic Party, especially when Jon Corzine dips into his bank account.  I think that conventional wisdom is dead wrong this year for the reasons I outlined above, and also because I think the voters are more fed-up than usual back home.  People are very angry with the state’s ongoing tax situation, and with the national economy still in the tank, anger is being directed at the governor.

That Corzine has never, ever been able to well-connect on a personal level with voters will finally cost him.  In 2000, he had to $67 million to beat a weak challenger (Franks) by 50-47 despite having Al Gore carrying the state by 16 points at the top of the ballot.  Five years later, he won the governorship over another weakling (Forrester), but had spend over $40 million to do so.  This year, the electorate is angrier, his opponent is stronger, and given the state of the economy, he may not even be able to spend — or perhaps not even actually possess — the disposable income to pull him over the finish line.  There is a reason Jon Corzine has never been loved: he is pretty dry and boring, and certainly hard to relate to.  These days, being a multi-millionaire former Goldman Sachs executive is not a winning asset for a politician seeking to ingratiate himself with voters.

I realize it is only one voter, but my mother, someone who absolutely never votes for Republicans for anything, is prepared to vote for Christie.  And guess what — she is an Essex County voter.  People are pissed.  This year is different.  I see Republicans breaking their 12-year losing streak in statewide elections.  Chris Christie will knock out Jon Corzine.  Of this, I am extremely confident.

(Btw, I freely acknowledge that just a few months ago I said that Republicans should not get their hopes up in challenging Corzine.  Well, people are already to change their minds, and I have definitely come at least 150 degrees on this race.  Jon Corzine will lose.)

This article today demonstrates to me that despite Patrick’s weak stewardship of Massachusetts, the Globe remains firmly in his corner to the point that it is icing him down in the ring.  Still, can someone explain to me first how a couple dozen people can be seen as a “rally”, and second, why this is news at all?  The answers are that this was not some big rally and this event was not newsworthy.  Sadly, the Globe continues to report on meaningless events in an effort to prop up Patrick’s floundering governorship.  There are several reasons why the Globe is dying a quick death, and one of them is tripe like this.

But let me add a couple caveats:

1. I will still not read the Boston Herald, which makes the New York Post look like the New York Times.

2. Deval Patrick is still heavily favored to win a second term next year — after all this is Massachusetts we are talking about.

In making a SCOTUS nomination, Presidents today are ultra careful in picking a nominee without a hint of written controversy or bold thinking — left or right — in their background. I am suggesting that not only should Obama not rule out someone who might have a little bit of controversy in his or her background, but that he should actively seek such a nominee. Indeed, while being bold may not be something the young administration wants to do just months out of the gate and with a myriad of other problems in the hopper, Obama and Democrats will never, ever have as great a chance as they do right now to pick a bold and clearly liberal choice to the Supreme Court.

For those who are not lawyers or big SCOTUS followers, I am not going to use this post to focus on any legal minutia; instead I am going to look solely at pragmatic and political concerns inherent in Obama’s impending decision and why he should resist the conventional wisdom of a Sonia Sotomayor. I am not even going to go over the rosters of names you’re seeing all over the place because I do not think that is terribly important right now given the deluge of similar analysis across the web today.

The State of the Supreme Court: Advantage Conservatives

As it stands today, conservatives have a decided advantage when it comes to control of the Supreme Court. This should be no real surprise given that seven of the nine Justices were appointed by Republican Presidents. Yet beyond that, conservatives look to have a strong hold on the Court in the years to come because Republican Presidents were also wiser in their appointments than Democrats (actually, just Bill Clinton). This is because Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush actively sought out nominees who were young and could sit on the High Court for over a generation. To demonstrate what this means, let’s examine the current Court roster:

Chief Justice John Roberts Jr: 53 years old, 50 when appointed by Bush II
Justice John Paul Stevens: 89 years old, 55 when appointed by Ford
Justice Antonin Scalia: 72 years old, 50 when appointed by Reagan
Justice Anthony Kennedy: 72 years old; 51 when appointed by Reagan
Justice David Souter: 67 years old; 50 when appointed by Bush I
Justice Clarence Thomas: 60 years old; 43 when appointed by Bush I
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg: 76 years old; 60 when appointed by Clinton
Justice Stephen Breyer: 70 years old; 55 when appointed by Clinton
Justice Samuel Alito: 59 years old; 55 when appointed by Bush II

Clearly, Republicans have a more conservative Supreme Court today because GOP Presidents have been in office to proffer nominations for most of the current Justices. But a part of this control comes from the foresight of Presidents Reagan, Bush and Bush in tapping jurists who could serve for the long haul. 50, 55, 50, 51, 50, 43, and 55 were ages of the GOP-appointed Justices at the time of their elevation. Breyer was a fair 55 when picked by Bill Clinton, but Ruth Bader Ginsberg was 60 years old when she was named to replace Byron White in 1993. Faced with a conservative-dominated Supreme Court even in 1993 and 1994, President Clinton showed an astonishing lack of foresight in going with, simply put, old nominees for the vacancies he was given when the Court was already Republican-dominated in the early nineties.

For those who don’t follow the Court as much, Justices Stevens and Souter have turned out fair more leftist than their original sponsors ever anticipated, and today they are both part of the generally-named liberal core on the Court, along with Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito make up the conservative bloc. Justice Kennedy is the Court’s biggest swing vote, but it is fair to say that he sways to the right on more matters than not. Still, even Kennedy aside, there is a four-man conservative group with an average of 61 (53+72+60+59) years old. The liberal bloc’s average age (including Souter) comes to 75.5 (89+67+76+70) years old; excluding Souter the average is 78.3 years old — almost 20 years above the average of the conservative core. I grant that the latter numbers are skewed heavily by Justice Stevens’ advanced age, but the fact is that he is on the Court and apparently still running strong. Therefore, we have no idea when he will finally hang up his spurs, and must include him. What are those numbers again?

Average age of the Conservative Core: 61 years
Average age of the Liberal Core: 78.3 years

Consequently, what we have today is a Court which is controlled by a majority conservative group, and which, barring an unforeseen retirement or passing, will be controlled by this group in the years to come. In other words, barring the shocking retirement of Justice Scalia in the near future, these Justices will control the tenor and direction of the Court’s jurisprudence regardless of who President Obama replaces Justice Souter with (or even Justice Stevens, assuming he retires in the coming years). Given these circumstances, Obama should look long and hard at who he wants to on the Court (duh!).

Building a Liberal Intellectual Center on the Court

In my view, this is the crux of the choice facing Obama as he considers Souter’s replacement. Does he go with the expected choice, likely a more moderate, milquetoast judge who is today sitting on the United States Courts of Appeal and has been careful to not issue many opinions which could be seen as politically controversial? Or does he decide to make a bold choice and tap a clearly liberal individual who has expressed her ideology and bold viewpoint(s) at some point? Naturally, there are many ways to frame Obama’s decision and it is not such a simple matter as looking at one angle, but I want to look at the decision from this viewpoint.

I have zero doubt that the initial inclination of many politicians and even some higher-ups in the administration is to take the less-controversial route, and tap a nominee on one of the Federal circuit courts who possesses a written record that does not smack of liberal leanings, or really any leanings at all. The thought process behind this is that such a nominee might encounter Republican resistance — heck, it is not possible to find a nominee who would be unopposed by the right — but he or she will nonetheless be much more easily confirmed.

Additionally, I think that one of the key aims of the White House in its pick is to find a non-white male, specifically a female, black, Hispanic, et al., or some combination thereof. This is why you are going to hear the name Sonia Sotomayor many, many times over the next few months, up to when Obama names his choice. Indeed, Sotomayor is both a woman and a Hispanic, so she possesses two assets Obama is likely seeking; not to mention, she has a good life story and is a longtime member of the Second Circuit, arguably the second most prestigious court after the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit, and thus she has instant legal credibility as a nominee.

Nonetheless, I think Sotomayor, as well as several other potential nominees whose names have been bandied about for years are uninspiring, and frankly mediocre political choices, and Obama should look in other directions. Put another way, in part because individuals like Sotomayor are perceived as the best — read: safest — potential selections, Obama should look elsewhere for three important reasons.

Searching for Brennan

While its legacy remains intact in many key areas, much to the consternation of liberals, the Warren Court has been gone for some time. It was finally replaced by the Rehnquist Court in the late 1980s and 1990s, and even a bit today by the Roberts Court’s decisions. The Warren Court represented the high point in modern legal history where a robust bloc of liberal judges controlled American jurisprudence. Led by Earl Warren, William Brennan, Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall, the Warren Court made a lasting impact on a plethora of matters which exists up through today, despite the best efforts of skeptical conservative jurists. The last living parts of this body disappeared with the retirement of Marshall in 1991, and death of Brennan in 1997. Since then, the liberal spirit that embodied the Warren Court has been left without a voice. With this nominations, and perhaps with others, Obama can make a bold move to find new similar voices in the mold of Brennan and Marshall. In fact, I believe that Obama should actively seek out a leading liberal voice to do just that, as the opportunity to carry out such an appointment in today’s super-polarized environment may never be greater than it is now.

In seeking Justice Souter’s replacement, Obama should consider first and foremost not moderate “consensus-builders” but clear liberal thinkers in the mold of William Brennan. Should he do so, he could put the stamp on his own legacy, and ingratiate liberals by hearkening back to the Warren Court.

Now, what do I mean exactly? Obama should try to implant a new core component on the Court to help bolster what is clearly an aged liberal bloc. Obama should aim not for another Breyer — an unquestioned smart and qualified lower court judge — but instead look for another Marshall: an individual who may have a clearly left-wing bent in his or her legal outlook, and who also may have the unique social background to influence his or her jurisprudence. This may seem counter-intuitive given today’s confirmation wars, but in the end Obama should actively look for a jurist who has written, orated and expounded on the big legal questions of the day, and not look for the Roberts-lite model who carefully eschewed ever expressing anything noteworthy all in the name of confirmation expediency.

This would take boldness, a boldness to find and tap a nominee with a clear and established liberal record, and stand by him or her while all the stones and rocks are being thrown, and the ensure their confirmation with numerous cowardly senators looking for cover.

55 or older need not apply

This consideration is the easiest to delineate. Simply that Obama should look very closely at the age of a prospective nominee, and he should reject certain choices if they are too old. While it is impossible to pinpoint the “right” age of a choice, I think that Obama should nix any one who is over 55 years old, if not 53.

As demonstrated above, the liberal core today is way too old, especially when compared with the conservative bloc of Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito. Appointing an older nominee over 55 or perhaps closer to 60 would do very little to help begin to put in place a liberal bloc — and thus a liberal legacy — for the new President. Should Obama put on some one in the late 50s, that person might end up retiring before Roberts and Alito despite being tapped some years after those choices. Such a possibility should be untenable for Obama and his brain trust.

As a result, many of the people supposedly on the President’s list should be axed. Others on the cusp of 55, including both Sotomayor and Obama friend and famous law professor Cass Sunstein are right on the our line, and that fact should be given strong consideration. In my view, the closer a credible possibility is to the good side of 50, the better.

This mean seem overly-simplistic, and thus kind of silly; I can understand that. But the fact is that if Obama wants to make an impact on the Court, and begin to remake the Court’s makeup, he cannot go with a nominee who won’t be around Washington for at least a generation. The change to remake a new Court in the mold of the Warren Court — or whatever you’d like to call it — is going to take many years and many changes on the body, and thus can only be ensured with truly young, new blood.

The Time is Ripest

The third key reason for Obama to make a bold (and liberal) selection is that the current national political environment and the makeup of the Senate are more advantageous for Obama to make such a move than they have been in decades, and they may not be this favorable to a Democratic President again for 100 years.

For one thing, Obama today enjoys impressive approval ratings, and they have remained steady for some time. Sure, those numbers won’t stay in the 60s forever, but right now — and likely for the near future — they are solid, and as a result, Obama has a good deal of political capital to spend. And there are few areas of greater importance today that the U.S. Supreme Court.

Second, is the composition of the Senate, where Democrats have a very large majority which verges on 60 votes — the number needed to turn off Republican filibusters. With Arlen Specter’s high-profile switch earlier this week, Democrats now sit at 59, and it is likely they will get to 60 whenever Al Franken is seated, an eventuality I think will occur at before Obama’s nomination is ultimately voted on. It’s not every day that a President enjoys a 60-seat majority in the upper chamber, and Obama would be crazy not to take advantage by putting on someone with unquestioned liberal credentials as opposed to a moderate who he hopes could garner a couple of Republican stragglers.

Make no mistake: basically irregardless of any nominee Obama will pick, Republicans will strongly object and fight. Even if Obama picks the most uncontroversial, moderate jurist, he can expect nearly every Republican Senator to vote ‘no.’ The judicial wars have become too partisan, and much too important for Republicans to ever strongly support any high Democratic nominee, whether it be for the Supreme Court or for an important seat on a circuit. Obama can expect incredible opposition for just about any of the names being bandied about, as well as others not being considered.

Judicial nominations today are the golden issue for the Republican base. During the second Bush administration, GOPers returned to the issue time and again as a means of ginning up their base — using endless fundraising appeals, and who can forget the “Justice for Judges” Senate marathon where Bill Frist halted all business to have the Senate discuss a handful of judicial nominations for 50 hours straight? — and bashing Democrats as “obstructionist.” This is because many conservatives view the judiciary, and the High Court especially, as a crucial place of focus, and that the ability to place strong conservatives on the Federal courts is the key step towards undoing Roe v. Wade and other decisions they view as abominations. With Republicans no longer in control of the confirmation process — GOPers had a robust 55-seat majority in 2005, allowing them to easily place Roberts and Alito on the bench with little trouble or resistence — they may not be able to stop Obama’s nomination, but they sure as heck will object, if for no other reason than to reinvigorate their base after long strings of bad electoral news.

Unfortunately for Republicans, none of that should matter since, as the vote-count below demonstrates, Obama should be able to get 51 votes for confirmation (we will get to the filibuster question afterward).

Counting the votes

Let’s go through the entire Senate roster and determine how a vote might look for any Obams SCOTUS nomination

Absolutely, positively 100% sure to vote for any choice
Daniel Akaka (HI), Mark Begich (AK), Michael Bennet (CO), Jeff Bingaman (NM), Barbara Boxer (CA), Sherrod Brown (OH), Roland Burris (IL), Maria Cantwell (WA), Ben Cardin (MD), Tom Carper (DE), Bob Casey (PA), Chris Dodd (CT), Richard Durbin (IL), Russ Feingold (WI), Dianne Feinstein (CA), Al Franken (MN), Kirsten Gillibrand (NY), Kay Hagan (NC), Tom Harkin (IA), Dan Inouye (HI), Tim Johnson (SD), Ed Kaufman (DE), Ted Kennedy (MA), John Kerry (MA), Amy Klobuchar (MN), Herb Kohl (WI), Frank Lautenberg (NJ), Patrick Leahy (VT), Carl Levin (MI), Joe Lieberman (CT), Claire McCaskill (MO), Bob Menendez (NJ), Jeff Merkley (OR), Barbara Mikulski (MD), Patty Murray (WA), Bill Nelson (FL), Mark Pryor (AR), Jack Reed (RI), Harry Reid (NV), Jay Rockefeller (WV), Bernie Sanders (VT), Chuck Schumer (NY), Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Debbie Stabenow (MI), Jon Tester (MT) (facing a very hard re-elect in 2012, but I think he hunkers down on this vote), Mark Udall (CO), Tom Udall (NM), Mark Warner (VA) (moderate freshman, but hard to see him opposing), Jim Webb (VA) (facing a difficult challenge in 2012, but he’s his own man), Sheldon Whitehouse (RI), and Ron Wyden (WA).

Naturally, some of these votes will be weaker than others. Begich was just elected in red Alaska, barely beating Ted Stevens, but he does not face the voters again until 2014. Bennet could also face a tough race next year, but I can’t see him bucking the President. Hagan is from North Carolina, but she won by nine points, and Pryor just won a second term unopposed. Warner just won his first term with incredible ease. The two hardest votes could be Tester and Webb, as both face potentially rough races in 2012, but both of their temperments — tough as heck — and political outlooks (mostly socially liberal) are precisely the kind to back the President on a tough vote like SCOTUS.

The total from this list comes to 51 votes, a exact majority needed for confirmation, and we have not even gotten to the nine weaker Dem votes. Those are Max Baucus (MT), Evan Bayh (IN), Robert Byrd (WV), Kent Conrad (ND), Byron Dorgan (ND), Mary Landrieu (LA), Blanche Lincoln (AR), Ben Nelson (NE), and Arlen Specter. Of these, I would expect Conrad and Dorgan to vote ‘aye’, even though they are from North Dakota; both are usually stand-up votes. Ditto Bayh, despite his strange push to the center of late. Lincoln is facing re-election next year, so who knows? Byrd and Landrieu are entirely unpredictable, and Nelson and Specter could certainly vote against since they are probably the two most Republican-leaning Dem votes in the Senate. And these are conservative estimates; the point being that cobbling together a simple majority for any nominee should be imminently doable.

On the GOP, we can pencil in just about every one of them voting ‘no’ regardless of the nominee. Senators Collins, Lugar, Snowe, and Voinovich could possibly vote for some nominees, with Snowe and Collins voted for any female nominee, in my opinion. That makes, by my count, 36 GOP Senators who are guaranteed ‘no’ votes for the Souter replacement.

Filibuster trouble?

Which leads us to the $64,000 question: could Obama’s nominee by filibustered? It seems clear me that any Obama nominee will able to muster a majority in the Senate despite the presence of many moderate Democrats and others who face tough re-elections over the next two cycles. Therefore, the most troubling thing that could derail his nominee’s chances in the Senate would be a Republican filibuster aimed at bottling up the nomination. To properly assess this possibility, we should look at two issues: first, the chances of Republicans deciding to mount a filibuster, and second, whether or not they could find any Democrats to join the filibuster in order to ensure that cloture — three-fifths of the body — can not materialize.

To be candid, a Republican filibuster of Obama’s nominee would represent the absolute height of political hypocrisy. When Bush II was in office, and Republicans reigned in the Senate, they screeched and howled when Democrats held up a small handful of Bush’s nominees to the courts of appeal. Bush himself as well as Republicans in the Senate led by then-Majority Leader Bill Frist assailed the blocking and called Democratic use of the filibuster to bottle up judicial nominations against Senate rules. In turn, they threatened the so-called “nuclear option” which would have eliminated Democrats’ filibusters and led to partisan warfare on the Senate floor even greater than that which pervaded the institution at the time (and today).

For Republicans to decide now today that filibustering judicial nominees is a-okay after decrying their use so vociferously would smack of hypocrisy and partisan double standards. Really, it would defy fair and reasoned explanation. Perhaps amusingly, despite all of that, I expect a great many Republican Senators to push using a filibuster on Obama’s nominee. Times have changed since 2003-to-2005, and desperate times call for desperate measures. Republicans have lost over a dozen seats over the past two midterm elections. Today they sit at just 40, a small minority. Their options are very limited, and perhaps more important, their caucus is dominated almost entirely by strong conservatives who take glee in partisan batles and view the judicial nominations process as more vital than any matter other the Senate considers — ground zero for the culture wars.

I think a great many Republicans, probably a majority of the current caucus will support a filibuster should they find Obama’s choice particularly objectionable. To Republicans, even if a filibuster was doomed from the start, it would at least be a means of ginning up the party faithful on a favorite issue and perhaps improve immediate party fundraising. And we all know that in light of the recent “tea parties” and subsequent activities, elected Republicans are today not averse to playing solely to their hardcore supporters.

Whether or not Mitch McConnell and the GOP leadership would be able to convince their entire caucus to support a filibuster is another matter. While the 40-Member caucus is nearly entirely right wing, there would be no margin for error here: McConnell would have to convince every person in his caucus to filibuster, and then go and find at least one Democrat to join in. The first matter would hardly be guaranteed, mostly because of the presence of Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins. That McConnell could arm-twist and cajole his caucus into being united against Obama’s choice is not a possibility I would dismiss; in fact, I believe he could do it, simply by appealing to their diminished status. However, the hardest part might be getting the Maine twins on board, and I think their support for filibuster would depend solely on the specific nominee; in other words, they would not be a sure filibuster vote regardless of nominee as a Tom Coburn or Jim DeMint would be.

To be frank, if Obama ends up nominating a woman, I can’t see Snowe and Collins voting against her confirmation, much less voting to uphold a filibuster. This is especially true if someone like Sonia Sotomayor is the pick. But let’s assume that Obama nominates a very established male liberal for the post, and as a result, not only do Republicans mount a filibustering effort, but that Snowe, Collins, Lugar, and Voinovich all jump on board. If all of that happens, I still think a filibuster would fail. It would fail for the simple reason that I can’t see even a single Democrat voting with Republicans to block a nomination.

Even the most unscrupulous, self-interested pol would have a hard time bucking his leadership and the White House and go support a filibuster. Should a Member decide that he or she can’t vote ‘aye’ for one reason or another, they can always vote against confirmation in the end (assuming their vote is not vitally needed). But they would be forbidden from filibustering. In terms of the most dangerous possible switch-over, Arlen Specter, I find very hard to envision him casting one of his first big votes as a Democrat to filibuster a Supreme Court nominee and thus embarrass the President. Such a move would assure Specter of a nasty primary fight — something he would just as soon avoid now. If Specter has any political sense, he wont do something so foolish.

As a result, I don’t see a filibuster as particularly viable, or at all likely to succeed even if the Republicans are united. What this means is that Obama has the ability to make a bold choice for Souter’s replacement, and he should almost certainly have more than enough votes to assure confirmation. Given this reality, he should be timid in who he decides to nominate.

Conclusion

I set out to write this little piece mostly because I’ve been hearing the name Sonia Sotomayor for some time, and I find her potential nomination both uninspiring on a personal and political level. Sure, Sotomayor is the “obvious” choice because she is a woman, she is Hispanic, she has a nice life story and a great pedigree, and she sits on a respected appellate court, therefore making her nomination both ground-breaking and completely viable.

Yet, I think Obama can do better, much better. In my amateur legal view — I did not go to Hah-vahd, I did not clerk, and I am not one of those lawyers who likes to tell people in casual conversation that I was on the law review (in part because I wasn’t!) — Sotomayor is legally undistinguished, and has written few noteworthy opinions and even fewer legal articles which espouse anything bold. And this does not only apply to Sotomayor, but to numerous appellate court judges who are likely being considered and are today being mentioned in the many articles pervading media and cyberspace.

The fact is that is I view the U.S. Courts of Appeals as a judicial Senate of sorts. It is full of smart, and super-ambitious judges who dream of perhaps one day sitting on the High Court, much in the same way that many senators dream of sitting in the Oval Office (though, to be fair, I think all senators dream of being President). As a result, many of these judges are incredibly meticulous in writing narrow, vanilla opinions and articles in hopes of never saying anything controversial while at the same time perhaps attracting the attention of a White House counsel or someone at People for the American Way who could push their name as a confirmable Justice one day. This view well describes some of the Court today: certainly John Roberts and maybe Stephen Breyer. And these are precisely the names that Obama should not seek to duplicate.

For one thing, nowhere in the Constitution does it require that a Justice by a former judge on a Federal circuit court, despite the fact that that is where most Justices now come from. Additionally, Obama does not have to pick someone who is over 55 years old. Being old is not a constitutional prerequisite.

From the liberal perspective, what the Supreme Court most needs now is an intellectual thinking capable of leading a new bloc and generating new ideas for the new century. If it were up to me, I would pick someone like Noah Feldman, a 39-year old Harvard Law School professor. Feldman is a brilliant legal thinker, and he has written and expounded on a host of legal topics of considerable significance. Yes, he has said many controversial things that would drive conservatives up a wall and lead to nasty (but nonetheless fun-to-watch) confirmation hearings, but he’s a true intellectual, and perhaps most important, he could serve for 40 or more years.

I just use Feldman as an example of what I think Obama should look for: a bold, smart selection. Realistically, Obama is not going to pick Feldman because he is too bold, and also because he wants to tap a minority candidate or a woman. But from a political standpoint, it is my hope that Obama, a former constitutional law professor with perhaps a greater appreciation for the judicial process than any President in recent history, will fully recognize the need to consider a new direction for his choice, and he won’t take the default route of a court of appeals judge with a milquetoast record. Someone like Feldman who is being considered seriously is Elana Kagan. Given that she is under 50 years old, she might be the best option of the names today being circulated (though, the fact that she has been Solicitor General for around a month might complicate matters). Someone like Cass Sunstein — a well known law professor, and also Obama friend — would be good, but his age of 55 concerns me some.

I have no doubt that Obama is taking the issue extremely seriously. This is one decision where he is a super-expert in making a wise choice. But he should decide not to put someone too old on the Court. In this layman’s view, 55 years old should be the high mark, if not even lower than that. And at the very least, he should not shy away from any choice simply because that person might be seen as too controversial because they’ve actually expressed their views in public.

If he wants, Obama can use this nomination as the first step towards finally finding for liberals their new judicial icon, both to replace what men like William Brennan provided, and to counteract the overshadowing work on Antonin Scalia, and now John Roberts. It’s up to him whether he wants to be safe or bold.

Maybe it is dreary to me alone, but I find Richardson’s past few months kind of amazing. Sure, he never had a legitimate chance at the White House, but as late as last year, he was the political king of New Mexico, and a strong contender to be a United States Senator or Secretary of State. Instead, Richardson passed on a Senate run (in my opinion, because he thought it would be small potatoes to someone who had already been in Congress and the cabinet; which is too bad, since he would have won in a walk), and Obama passed Richardson over for the SOS slot for Hillary Clinton, despite Richardson’s primary endorsement of Obama. (While Richardson was not happy about the decision, deep down he had to appreciate Obama’s political calculus in selecting his former bitter foe over a helpful ally, proving once again that in politics, expediency almost always trumps loyalty.)

Anyway, after reading this piece, I thought of that great line in “The Dark Knight”, where Harvey Dent (or maybe it was Bruce Wayne, or both), says “you either die a hero, or you live long enough to become the villain.” I hate to equate real-life matters to movies, and I am not saying Richardson is a hero, but clearly he is a man who may have stayed on the big stage just a bit too long, and as a result he finds himself as yesterday’s news.

But a big part of the results were that Democrats seized their opportunities through superb fundraising, and even more importantly, outstanding recruitment of candidates who were ultimately able to win moderately red districts and very, very red districts. At the same time, Republicans were almost impotent in their quest to recruit. Make no mistake, however, this was not some new phenomenon borne of our of 43rd President. As our last post shows, Democrats have had a built-in advantage in branching out to districts for some time.

To wit: consider Gene Taylor (elected 1989), Jim Matheson (2000), Ike Skelton (1976), Rick Boucher (1982), and Chet Edwards (1990). Each of them was elected several terms ago, and all of them have become well entrenched in their insanely Republican homelands.

And the Republicans? Mike Castle was elected in 1992, Frank LoBiando in 1994, Pat Tiberi and Mark Kirk in 2000, Jim Gerlach in 2002, Charlie Dent and Dave Reichert in 2004, and Cao in 2008. For those eight Members, that comes out to an average of 7.5 years, or just under four terms a pop.

In order to not draw on a limited sample for the Dems, let’s look at the elected years of all of the Democrats (note that I will clump in special election winners from odd years in the next election cycle; so, for example, Gene Taylor, who first won his seat in 1989, will be listed in the 1990 cycle) to make a fuller comparison:

2008 (21): Halvorson, Foster, Adler, Grayson, Schauer, Kissel, Dahlkemper, Kosmas, McMahon, Boccieri, Massa, Nye, Periello, Kirkpatrick, Markey, Teague, Griffith, Kratovil, Childers, Bright, Minnick.

2006 (15): McNerney, Walz, Donnelly, Gillibrand*, Arcuri, Wilson, Kagan, Hall, Giffords, Mitchell, Shuler, Altmire, Space, Ellsworth, Carney

2004 (5): Bean, Herseth-Sandlin, Chandler, Melancon, Boren

2002 (2): Marshall, Lincoln Davis

2000 (2): Matheson, Ross

1998 (3): Moore, Rodriguez, Hill

1996 (5): Berry, Snyder, Ethridge, McIntyre, Boyd

1992 (3): Stupak, Holden, Pomeroy

1990 (3): Taylor, Edwards, Peterson

1988 (1): Tanner

1984 (1): Gordon

1982 (4): Boucher, Ortiz, Mollohan, Sprat

1976 (2): Skelton, Rahall

1974 (1): Murtha

All together, the average tenure of service for these 69 Democratic Members of Congress comes to approximately 7.6 years, or just about four terms. This comes out to be the same as the GOP average, where the universe is clearly far smaller. Excluding the 21 freshman (plus Childers and Foster), the number ticks up to 10.98 years, or five and a half terms. In case you can’t tell, these are pretty big numbers. And at least to me, they demonstrate impressive staying power for Dems in many districts they really have no place winning and then keeping.

The reason I spell out these averages here is because I want to refute the notion that Democratic control of these districts is not indicative of anything salient, and that once another electoral tide appears, this one against the Blue Team, then many of these Members will be washed out. Not so.

Note that 15 of the Members above came to office before the Republican Revolution of 1994. In other words, they withstood the enormous anti-Democratic tide of that year — many of them easily — and they have hung on ever since. To me, this is critically important because it shows that Democratic success in congressional elections has not hinged on the 2006 and 2008 elections alone. The seeds of triumph were planted in the ground and grown up before then, in numerous examples years before.

What this all means is practical terms is that Dems have a tremendous blueprint in place for winning and holding seats across the country, while the Republicans have a terrible existing model. The Republican Party will be unable to win back Congress and then hold it again if it cannot find a way to either (1) dislodge a lot of the above Dems, either through direct challenge or via retirements; (2) begin to promulgate their own candidates who can win in deep blue territory; or (3) both.

So what’s their best option before them? Let’s consider the route of taking these seats back for Team Red. There is certainly low-hanging fruit here. Minnick and Bright are in overwhelmingly GOP districts, and they won their seats by less than 2% apiece. Other freshman had problems winning last year, and can be beaten with some luck and gumption by the Republicans.

But problems abound, most notably that a great many of these Democrats, particularly the entrenched ones, are not that old and are thus unlikely to retire soon. For example, Gene Taylor and Chet Edwards are both under 60 years old, Ben Chandler is 49, and Jim Matheson is only 48! None of them will ever lose, barring some very unforeseen development, and this should drive Republicans nuts because they should own these seats like the Giants own the Cowboys in big games.

There are exceptions, of course. Minnick and Bright, for one, Skelton’s seat once he retires (assuming he doesn’t leave in 2012 and his seat is dissolved when Missouri loses a seat in the next census), Grayson (who I think has one term written all over him), and Kratovil, who will face enormous obstacles to hang on next year. The fact still remains that making significant inroads in Dem-occupied red lands could take the Elephants many years. Still, their best bet is that group of 36 name that gained elected over the last two cycles. The GOP needs to try to pick off some of those to ensure they don’t become entrenched and end up as a group of new Taylors and Tanners. Unfortunately, since several of the ’06 crop won second terms with such ease, it may be too late for many fronts.

In my mind, this leaves proper recruitment as both the best shortterm and longterm panacea for the Republicans. I know, I know: this is some revelation! Yet, for a party that has so clearly done a piss-poor job of branching out politically into districts as well as the Donkeys, it might not be as clear to the GOP House brass as it is to keen political observers like T2L’s readers.

One of the worst things that has happened to the Republican Party in the last several years, besides losing the House, the Senate, and the White House, is that the party has become painfully marginalized, mostly because its moderate elements have been defeated, retired, excommunicated, or have shriveled up and died politically.

These names are many: Jim Saxton (a pro-environment Republican who was denied the Resources chairmanship by his party several years back), Nancy Johnson (ousted in 2006), Clay Shaw (also knocked out in ’06), Wayne Gilchrest (moderate beaten in a primary in 2008), Joe Schwarz (another moderate knocked out in a primary in 2006), Sherwood Boehlert (retired in 2006), Marge Roukema (denied the Financial Services gavel in 2002, retired, and replaced by an ultra-conservative), Jim Kolbe (retired in 2006 and replaced with a popular Democrat), and finally the smartest GOPer and moderate in the House, Tom Davis, who retired after the Virginia GOP effectively blocked him from running for Senate for not being conservative enough; ironically, his replacement was trounced by a Democrat.

The loss of these moderates has crippled the GOP, not just because many of their seats became votes for Pelosi for Speaker, but because the absence of their voices hurts the ability of the party caucus as a whole to be fully pragmatic and productive. As of now, the House Republican caucus likely resembles an echo chamber, where all the Members from Texas, Utah, Georgia and the like all repeat and endorse the same failed strategies and extremists perspectives. These Members needed those voices, a fact many of them likely cannot (or willfully will not) fathom. Until they do, the House GOP caucus’s mission to get back to majority status will not happen. Period.

Tomorrow I want to highlight a fresh story from today which highlights the dangers of conservative marginalization, and its plain absurdities in a political environment that remains caustic to Republicans.

For those of you unfamiliar with the system, or curious about how a PVI is tabulated, here is what Cook says:

A Partisan Voting Index score of D+2, for example, means that in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, that district performed an average of two points more Democratic than the nation did as a whole, while an R+4 means the district performed four points more Republican than the national average. If a district performed within half a point of the national average in either direction, we assign it a score of EVEN.

To determine the national average for these latest ratings, we have taken the average Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote for 2004 and 2008, which is roughly 51.3 percent, and that of Republicans, which is roughly 48.7 percent. So, if John Kerry captured 55 percent of the vote in a district and Barack Obama carried 57 percent in the district four years later, the district would have a PVI score of roughly D+5.

Like any other measure, the PVI is not perfect. Assuredly, there are a myriad of other ways to evaluate political lean or partisanship in a state or particular legislative district. However, given its rich history and strong reputation, I think Cook’s system is the best we have in creating a thorough evaluation tool for congressional districts.

Last year, we looked at the PVI numbers of the 110th Congress in a variety of ways. Indeed, there are so many fascinating ways to dissect and examine PVI data, that one could spend ages doing it. Here, we spent a good deal of time looking at crossover Members; in other words, Republicans representing districts that have Democratic-leaning PVIs, and Democrats who represent districts that lean towards the Republicans in national elections. After drawing them all out, the numbers were pretty stark, and they are worth pasting below for review:

110th Congress

Republicans representing Dem districts (14)

D+0 — Tom Latham (IA-04)

D+1 — Bill Young (FL-10), Vito Fossella (NY-13)

D+2 — Heather Wilson (NM-01), Peter King (NY-03), Jim Gerlach (PA-06), Charlie Dent (PA-15), Dave Reichert (WA-08)

D+3 — Jim Saxton (NJ-03), James Walsh (NY-25)

D+4 — Mark Kirk (IL-10), Frank LoBiando (NJ-02)

D+5 — Chris Shays (CT-4)

D+6 –

D+7 — Mike Castle (DE-AL)

D+8, 9, 10… None

At the time I made this post (August), here is what I wrote about the Republicans’ congressional situation:

These numbers are absolutely pathetic and should be troubling to any Republican. Of these 14, two seats — Fossella’s and Walshs’s — are almost assured of flipping in November, as both men are retiring (Fossella under bad circumstances), and the Democrats have strong nominees in each facing weak GOP opponents. Saxton is retiring, and the Democrats have recruited an excellent nominee (thought the race is a toss-up as the district has unique geographic which could favor the weak GOP nominee). And with Wilson leaving Congress after running for the Senate (and losing her primary), and Kirk, Reichert, and Shays all facing very tough races this year, all of their seats could potentially flip. At an absolute worst case scenario, half of these seats could be gone this time next year. More likely, I see four or perhaps five of them flipping — still a good results for Dems and a bad one for GOPers. This would leave nine of ten GOP Representatives sitting in Democratic seats out of close to 200 Members in the caucus.

(As it turned out, Republicans ended up losing several of the seats which belonged to the retiring Members, as well as numerous other ones which did not appear quite as endangered in three months before the election.)

Democrats representing GOP districts (51)

R+0 — Vic Snyder (AR-02), Carol Shea Porter (NH-01)

R+1 — Gabrielle Giffords (AZ-08), Tim Walz (MN-01), John Hall (NY-19), Michael Arcuri (NY-24), Solomon Ortiz (TX-27), Henry Cuellar (TX-28)

R+2 — Allen Boyd (FL-02), Tim Mahoney (FL-16), Bart Stupak (MI-01)

R+3 — Jerry McNerney (CA-11), Kirsten Gillibrand (NY-20), Bob Ethridge (NC-02), Mike McIntyre (NC-07), Jason Altmire (PA-04), Lincoln Davis (TN-04)

R+4 — Harry Mitchell (AZ-05), Joe Donnelly (IN-02), Dennis Moore (KS-03), Bart Gordon (TN-06), Ciro Rodriguez (TX-23), Steve Kagan (WI-04)

R+5 — Melissa Bean (IL-08), Bill Foster (IL-14), Charlie Melancon (LA-03), Dan Boren (OK-02)

R+6 — Bud Cramer (AL-05), John Salazar (CO-03), Collin Peterson (MN-07), Zach Space (OH-18), John Spratt (NC-05), Alan Mollohan (WV-02)

R+7 — Baron Hill (IN-09), Nancy Boyda (KS-02), Ben Chandler (KY-06), Don Cazayoux (LA-06), Heath Shuler (NC-11), Tim Holden (PA-17), Rick Boucher (VA-09)

R+8 — Jim Marshall (GA-08), Chris Carney (PA-10)

R+9 — Brad Ellsworth (IN-09)

R+10 — Travis Childers (MS-01), Stephanie Herseth (SD-AL)

R+11 — Ike Skelton (MO-04)

R+12 –

R+13 — Earl Pomeroy (ND-AL)

R+14 –

R+15 — Nick Lampson (TX-22)

R+16 — Gene Taylor (MS-04)

R+17 — Jim Matheson (UT-02)

R+18 — Chet Edwards (TX-17)

And here is what I said about the Democratic breakdown back in August (forgive the extended remarks):

The total here is a whooping 51 Members in GOP-leaning districts, with an impressive eight of them in seats which are R+10 or more. Try to conceptualize this for a moment. R+10 means that the district averages 10 percentage points higher to the GOP side in presidential elections. Think about that a minute. These are seats that go to the Republican presidential nominee by huge margins. And not all of them have been around forever: Childers was elected this May, Lampson in 2006 (after serving in the House prior to Tom DeLay’s redistricting plot redistricted him out of his seat), Herseth-Sandlin in 2004, and Matheson in 2000.

Right off the bat, I acknowledge that several of these individuals won their seats under unique circumstances involving corrupt or otherwise seriously flawed GOP incumbents. This list includes Gillibrand, Space, Cazayoux, Carney, and Lampson. Furthermore, many of these Members — 18, to be exact — won in the tidal wave of ’06, and therefore, some of them will probably have close races this fall. There is no question that specifically, Shea Porter, Boyda, Cazayoux, Carney, and Lampson are going to have a tough time winning.

But this should not take away from this list broadly illustrates. It speaks volumes to the Democrats’ outreach that they have just over 50 Members of their caucus in districts that are Republican, with over half in R+5 or greater districts. This is nothing short of amazing, even if it is partially the product of a rare wave election. Indeed, most of these men and women, even several in the infancy of their career, have already carved out electoral niches for themselves, and face minimal opposition this November. Others like Skelton, Pomeroy, and Edwards are basically unbeatable in enormously Republican districts. Sure, just about all of these seats will be gone when some of these men decide to hang it up, but the fact that they have held on this long says a lot about the political diversity of House Democratic Caucus and the national Democratic Party in general. Further, there are also plenty of Republicans whose districts will promptly turn the year they decide to “spend more time with their families.”

Taken together, the 14 vs. 51 number says a great deal about the present state and future direction of the parties. Going further, whereas only two GOP reps have D+5 or greater districts, 28 Democrats are in R+5 or more districts. And I have no even gone into this year’s map, where a plethora of Democrats appear even or slightly ahead in red districts.

Needless to say, my view then was that the Republicans were in grave danger of becoming an entirely right wing and regionalized political party while the Democrats had much greater extended success in electing and subsequently re-electing and entrenching their Members in Republican areas, as the rosters showed.

There are a plethora of ways to look deeper at the numbers. One is to look at the extremes: whereas there are just three Republicans today representing districts of D+5 or greater — pretty darn blue places — there are 43 Democrats in districts with a PVI of R+5 or more. That is a ratio of more than 14-to-1. And of those 43 Democrats, 26 of them have been in Congress for more than two terms so far.

In light of the new PVI numbers which I am about to go over, my view has not changed at all. If anything, I feel even more strongly in my arguments of seven months ago, as Republicans have lost nearly all of their moderates in the House, and Democrats have further bolstered their ranks with conservatives from bright red districts across the country.

How could this be possible given the wide dispartity that was already in place in the 110th Congress? Well, let’s take a look:

111th Congress

Republicans representing Dem districts (8)

D+1 — Frank LoBiando (NJ-02), Pat Tiberi (OH-12)

D+2 — Charlie Dent (PA-15)

D+3 — Dave Reichert (WA-08)

D+4 — Jim Gerlach (PA-06)

D+5 –

D+6 — Mark Kirk (IL-10)

D+7 — Mike Castle (DE-AL)

D+25 — Joseph Cao (LA-02)

Democrats representing GOP districts (69)

R+1 — Jerry McNerney (CA-11), Melissa Bean (IL-08), Deborah Halvorson (IL-11), Bill Foster (IL-14), Tim Walz (MN-01), John Adler (NJ-03), John Murtha (PA-12)

R+2 — Alan Grayson (FL-08), Joe Donnelly (IN-02), Mark Schauer (MI-07), Bob Ethridge (NC-02), Larry Kissel (NC-08), Kirstin Gillibrand (NY-20)*, Mike Arcuri (NY-24), Charlie Wilson (OH-06), Solomon Ortiz (TX-27), Steve Kagan (WI-08)

R+3 — Dennis Moore (KS-03), Bart Stupak (MI-01), John Hall (NY-19), Kathy Dahlkemper (PA-03)

R+4 — Gabrielle Giffords (AZ-08), Suzanne Kosmas (FL-24), Mike McMahon (NY-13), John Boccieri (OH-16), Ciro Rodriguez (TX-23)

R+5 — Vic Snyder (AR-02), Harry Mitchell (AZ-05), John Salazar (CO-03), Collin Peterson (MN-07), Mike McIntyre (NC-07), Eric Massa (NY-29), Glenn Nye (VA-02), Tom Periello (VA-05)

R+6 — Ann Kirkpatrick (AZ-01), Betsy Markey (CO-04), Allen Boyd (FL-02), Baron Hill (IN-09), Heath Shuler (NC-11), Harry Teague (NM-02), Jason Altmire (PA-04), Tim Holden (PA-17), John Tanner (TN-08), Nick Rahall (WV-03)

R+7 — Mike Ross (AR-04), Zach Space (OH-18), John Spratt (SC-05)

R+8 — Marion Berry (AR-01), Brad Ellsworth (IN-08), Chris Carney (PA-10)

R+9 — Ben Chandler (KY-06), Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (SD-AL), Alan Mollohan (WV-01)

R+10 — Jim Marshall (GA-08), Earl Pomeroy (ND-AL)

R+11 — Rick Boucher (VA-09)

R+12 — Parker Griffith (AL-05), Charlie Melancon (LA-03)

R+13 — Frank Kratovil (MD-01), Lincoln Davis (TN-04), Bart Gordon (TN-06)

R+14 — Ike Skelton (MO-04), Travis Childers (MS-01), Dan Boren (OK-02)

R+15 — Jim Matheson (UT-02)

R+16 — Bobby Bright (AL-02)

R+17 –

R+18 — Walt Minnick (ID-01)

R+19 –

R+20 — Gene Taylor (MS-01), Chet Edwards (TX-17)

The two numbers to focus on here are eight and 69. As in, there are just eight Republicans sitting in PVI blue seats, and a whooping 69 Democrats in red seats. That nearly a 9-to-1 ratio. (Note that for the 111th, Cook has gotten rid of R+0 and D+0 districts, finding that any time a district can be rounded down to zero, it is now rated as “EVEN”).

Despite four Dems in the 110th losing their seats last November — Tim Mahoney (FL-16), Nancy Boyda (KS-02), Don Cazayoux (LA-06), and Nick Lampson (TX-22) — all the others held on, and Democrats went from 51 to 69 (though, to be precise, some Members’ districts went from red to blue in their PVI number). That is not an insignificant gain by any stretch of the imagination.

In total, I count 21 freshman Democrats on this list (including Travis Childers and Bill Foster who were elected in spring 2008 special contests). Additionally, there are 15 Democrats on the list who won their second term in 2008.

Conversely, only one of the eight Republicans listed was elected in the last four years, Joseph Cao, and he is a fluke congressman who I would bet my Xemex watch and Oakley sunglasses will be tossed out next year like garbage strewn about after Mardi Gras. In other words, the Republicans are not electing any new blood to moderate districts and they are stuck with a small pack of Members which seems to dwindle a bit every two years. Indeed, from the 110th, the seats formerly held by Heather Wilson, Jim Saxton, Vito Fossella, James Walsh, and Chris Shays are now in the hands of the Democrats, with only Kirk, Gerlach, and Reichert surviving rough challenges.

In the next post, I will consider the implications of these numbers.

State Democrats are concerned that Republicans, who control both houses of the state legislature, as well as the governorship (which looks very likely to remain in GOP hands if Gov. Charlie Crist seeks a second term in 2010), will draw maps that are decidedly unfavorable to Democrats in Tallahassee and in Congress, similar to the current maps which were put together by Jeb Bush and legislative GOPers in 2001.

While Democrats are rightly concerned by the specter of another round of harsh redistricting in 2011, I don’t really agree with their efforts. Republicans deserve to be in charge of the process as they control Tallahassee with an iron fist. Democrats have had 10 years to retake the legislature, and they have failed, and they have not won the governor’s mansion since Lawton Chiles was re-elected in 1998. Republicans have held on to their political power in fine style, and redistricting is one of the key plums that comes from their political consolidation in the Sunshine State. Similar efforts by both parties have been sprinkled across the national landscape in recent years, and I abhor each of them. If you are a staunch party member, and in your state your party has strong minority status, then you should not be able to draw the lines. That’s just how it is. To the victor, goes the spoils.

In the article, several Dems loudly complain that the weird shapes of the districts themselves not only illustrate the fierce partisanship inherent in the process, but also that they make no sense and plainly look ugly. I find this line of argument more silly than anything else that is generally said in the fights that surrounds redistricting. The fact is that any districts, no matter how aesthetically pleasing their ultimate shapes turn out, are themselves arbitrary. There is no correct way for a district to be drawn or how it should look. Since the Founding, redistricting has been a political process, and districts themselves have very often not been “compact.” The argument that a district is in some way offensive because of an odd shape is foolish; even if all districts were perfect shapes of equal size, they too would be arbitrary, even if they look nice and compact.

If Dems and Republicans don’t look the way redistricting is happening in their state, they should work harder to take over their states’ political positions and machinery so that they can draw the maps the next time around. This has been going on for hundreds of years, and it should not just change today because the losers are upset.

As evidenced by his continued angry comments directed towards the NRSC and its chair Senator John Cornyn, Bunning is harboring a lot of resentment for Cornyn’s and others’ attempts to ease the junior bluegrass Senator into retirement. Recently, he threatened to sue the NRSC unless it backed him. He genuinely seems primed to run again despite his age and other issues. As we have discussed in the past, this is great news for Democrats.

At this point, anything can happen in this contest. Bunning is committed to running again, but a primary challenge from somewhere seems more and more likely as Bunning seems more and more out of it. The relative strength and credibility of a potential primary foe would determine if Bunning could be toppled before November 2010. Should Bunning hang on for the general, he would be in big trouble, especially as his erratic behavior and outbursts continue. At this point, the best the NRSC can hope for is that a good primary challenge will be able to win without national backing. The NRSC might be forced to publicly back Bunning — despite trying to recruit a different candidate already, drawing Bunning’s ire — but that does not mean that GOP power-players won’t work behind the scenes to bolster a primary foe who would not be a sure-loser in a general.

We’ll continue to follow this one closely, if for no other reason than its inherent comic value.